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Chapter 1: Introduction
Postmodern theories describe human subjectivity as fragmented.

(Faigley 12).

Unlike

Enlightenment thinkers, who theorized the Cartesian subject as an autonomous, stable, rational self with
“privileged insight into its own processes” (111), postmodern theorists “decisively [reject] the primacy
of consciousness and instead [have] consciousness originating in language, arguing that the subject is an
effect rather than a cause of discourse” (Faigley 9). The idea that language constructs who subjects are,
how they are, and who they may and may not become is very powerful, for it suggests subjects cannot
consciously know themselves apart from language. Self-knowledge results from social, institutional,
and political discourses surrounding subjects and from discursive interactions with others. Because selfknowledge depends upon multiple and sometimes conflicting discourses, what subjects know about
themselves, others, and reality is always situated, partial, and contingent (111) --depending upon the
rhetorical situation in which subjects find themselves.
As a result, postmodern theorists, especially in disciplines such as Rhetoric and Writing Studies,
have posited different theories of ontology to describe the conditions in which postmodern subjects exist
and to suggest how subjects might intervene in their own existence to create meaning and to develop a
more critical consciousness of themselves, others, and the world around them. These theories, however,
tacitly or explicitly privilege language’s role in constructing subjectivities.

Problem
The idea that language, alone, constructs subjects, however, is problematic. Subjects exist in
spaces of both discourse and silence, they use speech and silence to communicate intentions, and they
come to know the world through both. In Unspoken: A Rhetoric of Silence, Cheryl Glenn argues
silence functions as more than an absence or void that reveals speech; she suggests, “silence –the
unspoken --is a rhetorical art that can be as powerful as the spoken or written word. Like speech, the
meaning of silence depends on a power differential that exists in every rhetorical situation: who can
speak, who must remain silent, who listens, and what those listeners can do” (9). Glenn adds that
speech and silence are not oppositional: Silence “reveals speech at the same time that it enacts its own
1

sometimes complementary rhetoric” (3). While silence may not always be “empowering or patently
engaging” (18), it serves multiple purposes. Silence, like speech, is used to obfuscate; to express
agreement, disagreement, doubt, or anger; to discipline and punish; and to show concern, respect or
shared moods. Therefore, ontological theories that privilege language as the primary means through
which subjectivities develop do not acknowledge the ways silence enriches and problematizes our
subjectivities.
With this in mind, three questions seem particularly important: 1) To what extent does silence
construct subjectivity? 2) How might one add silence to an existing theory of subjectivity? 3) How
might acknowledging silence’s role in subjectivity be important in the composition classroom? This
paper inquires how silence shapes subjectivity and suggests how silence’s role in shaping subjectivity
may be used in the composition classroom.

Methodology
This study adopts a poststructuralist/postmodern theoretical lens. To this end, it embraces the
notions of poststructuralism and postmodern theory discussed in Steven Best and Douglas Kellner’s
Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations. It accepts poststructuralism as “a subset of a broader
range of theoretical, cultural, and social tendencies which constitute postmodern discourses” (25), and it
embraces poststructuralist/postmodern critiques of modern theory. For instance, it rejects the notion that
language (or silence, for that matter) is neutral and transparent with stable meanings. Instead, it sees
“the signified as only a moment in a never-ending process of signification where meaning is produced,
not in a stable, referential relation between subject and object, but only within the infinite intertextual
play of signifiers” (Best and Kellner 21). It also rejects structuralism’s reliance on science to study
culture and as a foundational structure upon which “truth, objectivity, certainty, and system” (Best and
Kellner 20) are built. This study also rejects structuralist notions of an essential human nature and
notions that “the mind [has] an innate universal structure,” and sees “forms of consciousness, identities,
signification, and so on as historically produced and therefore varying in different historical periods”
(Best and Kellner 20). This study also views meaning as socially constructed and views language as “a
2

site and object of struggle where different groups strive for hegemony and the production of meaning
and ideology” (Best and Kellner 26).
To arrive at a theory of subjectivity which includes silence, this study first reviews theories of
subjectivity from the Modern period through the Postmodern period. It then examines three theories of
subjectivity grounded in language to illustrate various ways postmodern subjects have been constructed.
Chapter 3 draws from scholars in Philosophy, Rhetoric and Composition, and Communication to
highlight the ways scholars have theorized silence.

It specifically focuses on ontological,

epistemological, ideological, and communicative theories of silence and indicates the ways in which
silence might add to a theory of subjectivity. In Chapter 4, these ideas about silence are then applied to
Foster’s notion of Networked Subjectivity. Chapter 5 discusses how composition classes and textbooks
traditionally treat silence and offers one way first-year composition instructors might teach silence as a
rhetorical act to students.

Rationale
Although the conclusions presented here may suggest a need to revisit previous notions of
subjectivity, this study may have greater ramifications when applied to the first-year composition
classroom. Currently, first-year composition privileges discourse as a means to create knowledge of the
self, others, and the world. Students focus, for instance, on the ways that language shapes ethos, logos,
and pathos, and the goal is often to use language alone to achieve one’s desired communicative ends. In
addition, social constructivist practices such as cooperative learning and peer review suggest that by
engaging in discussions with fellow students, individuals will achieve a fuller understanding of the
writing task, of themselves, and of others around them. While this conclusion may certainly be true, it is
also worth considering how silence enriches students’ understanding of themselves, others, and the
writing task. Instructors may then use another lens through which they can assist students in developing
a more critical consciousness.
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Chapter 2: Theories of Subjectivity
2.1

IDENTITY VERSUS SUBJECTIVITY
The terms “identity” and “subjectivity” connote different views about being in the world.

“Identity,” associated with modern discourses, indicates ontological unity – beings who can know
themselves and who can be known to others. Through reason, these beings consciously discover and
shape themselves despite cultural, social, or economic influences and power structures, and they thus
present themselves to the world as a finished, stable, unified self. In contrast, the term “subjectivity,”
associated with poststructuralist and postmodern discourses, connotes a kind of ontological multiplicity
– a recognition that although beings act in the world, they are also acted upon by others and by
processes beyond their control. This conception of being creates a different relation with the world, one
in which a body (subject) may be subjected (constrained, limited, controlled, disciplined, manipulated)
by the will, desire, or influence of others as well as by cultural, social, historical, linguistic, and power
structures surrounding it. Such forces determine what subjects may do and who subjects may become.
Thus, depending on the situation (i.e. the contexts, the people, the power structures in one’s life.), one’s
subject position shifts enabling one to assume simultaneously conflicting positions.
For postmodernists, then, the term “identity” is problematic because many postmodernists view
selves as multiple, fragmented, and unknowable; though subjects act in (and upon) the world, they are
also heavily constructed by processes over which they may have little or no control. Who subjects
become depends upon the circumstances in which they find themselves, and these circumstances
constantly change as do subjects’ positions and relations with the world.
The terms “identity” and “subjectivity,” therefore, are important because they reflect opposing
epistemologies. Throughout this section, then, I use the terms “subject” and “subjectivity” to refer to
poststructuralist and postmodern notions of being and the term “identity” only when quoting theorists
who use the term in their own texts or when referring to being in the Modern period.

4

2.2

THE SUBJECT FROM MODERNITY TO POSTMODERNITY
In Identity Crisis: A Social Critique of Postmodernity, Robert Dunn argues modern and

postmodern notions of subjectivity arose out of various social, cultural, and intellectual transformations
in society, which changed how scholars theorized subjects. These transformations included such things
as the decline of traditional group life; the rise of mass society; the development of new technology
during and after World War II; the development of linguistics and semiotics; the rise of media based
technologies; political activism; and the development of consumer culture. However, to differentiate
postmodern subjectivity from prior notions of subjectivity, it may be helpful to review how Western
thinkers conceived of subjectivity prior to its articulation in postmodern theory.

2.2.1

Modern Subjects
Dunn, who takes a socio-historical approach to subjectivity, says our notions of identity “could

have become a problem only following the emergence of large-scale society and the relative decline of
traditional group life in the West” (52). While in traditional cultures, identities were externally imposed
at birth based on “systems of kinship and religion” (53), the shift to “large scale society” (52) resulted in
weakened group ties, the questioning of traditional ideas and beliefs, and a focus on the “inner life of the
individual” (53). The rise of individualism brought belief in “autonomy, freedom, and choice” (53) and
an understanding that “modern life required self-definition” (53). Dunn says,
The assault on traditional social structures gave rise to an individual called on to forge his
(but seldom her) own identity independently of the ascribed characteristics inhering in
one’s placement in tradition and nature. Through resources of self, this individual was
seen as destined to receive, acquire, and fashion his own identity in an increasingly
unknown, uncertain, and rapidly changing world. Negotiating the contingencies of time
and place, this figure of self-creation was to achieve status within a more or less tenuous
social order by means of his own willful and self-interested actions. (53)

5

Although numerous modernist discourses about the subject exist, Dunn says these theoretically
posited one of three ways identity was constructed: In the Cartesian, Kantian, and Enlightenment
notions of “a rational and ‘knowing’ ego” (55), individuals were believed to have a pre-existing,
essential, unchanging self which was discoverable through one’s ability to reason. A second conception
of subjectivity argued that identity could also be found through “a romantic or existential search for
personal meaning” (55) as individuals isolated themselves from others or resisted society. Hegelian
notions, thirdly, proposed that many interactions with others formed one’s identity – although some
kinds of social interaction, like those at work, alienated individuals, while other kinds of interactions,
like those with the family or community, fostered identity (55).
Dunn says the attempt to create a unified subject or to view Modernity as a unified movement,
however, is problematic. As a cultural movement, it was divided into often opposing “intellectual and
moral tendencies” (53). Discourses within modernity, for example, posited numerous subjectivities for
individuals, which often conflicted with each other. Philosophical subjects in modernity perceived
themselves differently than literary, political, or economic subjects did (53-4), yet subjects often
occupied several of these different and conflicting positions.
As a historical period, Dunn suggests, modernity also divided subjects “along nationalistic,
racial, and ethnic lines” (54) as a result of nationalism, colonialism, and imperialism. Modernist
institutional processes also continually divided individuals. Dunn says, “Modernity created a plurality
of new ‘life spheres’ by means of institutional processes of differentiation. Family, work, religion,
education, the state, and other sanctioned patterns of social organization became sources of competing
claims on the self” (56). Economic and urban growth increased the kinds of social roles, relationships,
and identities subjects assumed (56) as did inequalities within social structures. Individuals were further
divided by class and gender.
Theoretically, modernist thinkers saw the subject divided by “agency and determination, as
acting and acted on, reflecting the modern antinomies of spontaneity and order, freedom and alienation,
activity and passivity, autonomy and domination” (54). Dunn credits these contradictions, however, as
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the reason for the many divergent discourses about modernist subjects and for the desire to create a
unified subject, which could rescue itself from the disorder of the Modern world.

2.2.2

Structuralist Subjects
Although modernist discourses such as Marxism, existentialism, and phenomenology

proliferated, particularly after World War II, Dunn suggests conceptions of a rational, unified subject
were not really directly questioned until “the linguistic turn in philosophy” (181) and the invention of
semiotics. Scholars then began examining how “thought and behavior were constituted linguistically”
(181). Language and sign systems were used to analyze culture and society and replaced modernist
notions of “the transcendental ego” (181). The merging of structuralist thought and semiotics caused
scholars to criticize the idea of a unified rational consciousness and the belief that meaning resided
within the individual. Instead, structuralists believed that meaning already existed within sign systems
and language structures. According to Best and Kellner, this view was particularly influenced by
Ferdinand de Saussure’s theory of language, which argued that language could be analyzed using a
closed (and somewhat stable) system of signs. Saussure suggested that linguistic signs were made up of
two parts: a signifier (the sound/written symbol) and the signified (its concept/meaning) (19), and he
suggested that these linguistic signs were arbitrary: there was not a natural connection between a
signifier and a signified. Rather, words acquired meanings through relations of difference and were
socially constructed.
According to Mary Klages, Saussure’s theory was important, too, because it suggested that
thought cannot exist without language (para. 24 Section II). She suggests language was believed to form
our perceptions about reality and ourselves and “the order that we perceive in the world is not inherent
in the world, but is a product of our minds” (para. 4).

The Modernist notion of subjects as unified,

autonomous, “knowing” beings became problematic because language created thought and perceptions,
and language structured one’s reality – not the “knowing” individual.

Because language shaped

subjects to such an extent, Best and Kellner argue structuralist subjects, unlike Modernist ones, were
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“dismissed” (19) as “an effect of language, culture, or the unconscious, and denied causal or creative
efficacy” (19). They add,
Structuralism stressed the derivativeness of subjectivity and meaning in contrast to the
primacy of symbolic systems, the unconscious, and social relations. On this model,
meaning was not the creation of the transparent intentions of an autonomous subject; the
subject itself was constituted by its relations within language, so that subjectivity was
seen as a social and linguistic construct. The parole, or particular uses of language by
individual subjects, was determined by langue, the system of language itself. (19)

2.2.3

Poststructuralist Subjects
Like structuralists, poststructuralists rejected the modern conception of a unified, rational

subject. At the same time, however, they also disagreed with structuralism’s attempt to use linguistic
systems as scientific structures for studying culture and for building foundations of truth, certainty, and
objectivity (Best and Kellner 20). Poststructuralists argued that structuralists merely replicated humanist
ideas of a stable human nature by suggesting that the “mind had an innate, universal structure” (20).
Instead, Best and Kellner contend poststructuralists privileged “a thoroughly historical view which sees
different forms of consciousness, identities, signification, and so on as historically produced and
therefore varying in different historical periods” (20). In addition, unlike structuralists, poststructuralists
privileged the signifier over the signified, emphasizing language’s “dynamic productivity” (21) and “the
instability of meaning” (21). Best and Kellner say, for instance, that “For poststructuralists . . ., the
signified is only a moment in a never-ending process of signification where meaning is produced not in
a stable, referential relation between subject and object, but only within the infinite, intertextual play of
signifiers” (21). This conception of language, also influenced notions of the subject, which, as Dunn
indicates, “was further dissolved in the instabilities of language” (181). The work of several theorists
helped to further destabilize structuralist notions of subjectivity.
Jaques Derrida’s theory of deconstruction, Dunn suggests, was crucial to disrupting conceptions
of stable subjects because it suggested that “direct linkages between signifiers and signifieds” (181) did
8

not exist, so meaning itself was not stable. According to Dunn, Derrida proposed that signs “operated
by means of a continual deferral to other signs, creating the possibility of an infinite regress of meaning”
(181). As a result, language users could not control how meaning was created (181). Dunn says,
Derrida’s major insight was that language worked by means of inclusionary and
exclusionary processes (hierarchies of which deconstruction exposed), leading to a
perpetual ‘absence’ within language in practice and therefore a habitual tendency for
language to undermine itself through its own gaps. In Derrida, the system of ‘difference’
that structured language in Saussure’s theory was replaced by a process of ‘defferal’ (the
French word differeance signifying both to ‘differ’ and ‘defer’). The ongoing generative
and degenerative aspects of language imply a subject that is forever being reconstituted
within the play of signs and a self rendered incoherent by ruptures in linguistic meaning.
(181-2)
Dunn argues, however, that poststructuralist subjects were also de-centered in other ways. Gilles
Deleuze and Felix Guattari privileged desire over language, suggesting that desire was “a prediscursive,
irreducible force in human behavior” (182), and Michel Foucault, who will be discussed in more detail
later, theorized the subject as constructed by discourse and power.

Jean-Francois Lyotard also

questioned the construction of historical subjects who, influenced by Enlightenment philosophies,
“turned ‘history’ into ‘progress’” (Dunn 183) using reason and action. Instead, Lyotard rejected the
notion that historical subjects liberate others through “heroic class actions” (183) because it perpetuates
a “master narrative” (183) for the benefit of “nation-states” (183). Ultimately, Dunn contends that
poststructuralism and poststructural theorists counter the notion of transcendental subjects in two ways:
They replace the conscious, rational subject by situating the subject within “notions of textuality, power,
and desire” (183). They also reject unifying “grand schemes” and instead privilege multiple and
“heteronomous accounts of historical development” (183).
The attractiveness of poststructuralism, Dunn says, was its emphasis on “particularity and
difference” (184), which appealed to, strengthened, and served the political purposes of groups
struggling for legitimacy. However, Dunn suggests poststructuralism did not solve the “problem of the
9

subject” (184) encountered by modernist and structuralist thinkers. Dunn argues that poststructuralism
does not overcome the “binary oppositions of Hegelian thought and structuralist method” (184), and
though it makes epistemological claims, it also suggests that all epistemological claims are faulty
because subjects cannot know their realities. Further, Dunn indicates that “in the very attempt to
postulate a disunified world, devoid of moral and rational intention, and full of flux, dispersion, and
difference, poststructualist thought, far from destroying it, ultimately reinvents metaphysics for its own
purposes” (184). The problem of metaphysics continues to arise, Dunn suggests, because theorists
cannot eliminate notions of consciousness from subjectivity. He argues,
By replacing consciousness with language and discourse, poststructuralists negate the
processes of self-reflection and self-formation in the creation and shaping of structural
relationships, thereby positing a conception of structure bereft of human and social
significance. Constructing a new metaphysics of the text, poststructuralism leaves the
subject-object dualism untouched by simply privileging the object in the form of the
‘always already’ constituted determinations of language and discourse. (186)
This privileging of language in constructing subjects, Dunn says, is problematic for numerous
reasons. First, it doesn’t account for “the sources of both diversity and change in the structures and uses
of language” (186). Second, some conception of the subject outside of language is needed in order for
meaning to be communicated and interpreted and for that communication to come to a close. Relegating
meaning only to the domain of language also results in a “dehistoricized and desocialized subject” (187).
Dunn argues, then, that poststructuralism rejects notions of individual “will, choice, freedom, and
interests” (187) as a basis for individual and group action. As a result, Dunn concludes that the
postructuralist subject is “a socially disembodied, discursively constructed and disconnected subject,
devoid of self-identity, historical context, or social relationality . . . (188). In addition, the subject has no
“social location” (188) or the ability to communicate and act. For Dunn, poststructuralism also does not
take into consideration “the underlying material and social forms and purposes embodied in discursive
practices and power” (188).
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2.2.4

The Postmodern and Postmodern Subjectivity
Defining the postmodern is difficult because, as Best and Kellner indicate, “there is no unified

postmodern theory, or even a coherent set of positions” (2). The term itself often confuses because
theorists in different disciplines use the term in different, sometimes conflicting ways (29). Generally,
Best and Kellner maintain that “the discourse of the postmodern . . . involves periodizing terms which
describe a set of key changes in history, society, culture, and thought” (29). The prefix “post” can refer
to that which is “‘not’ modern” (29), indicating a “a break with modern ideologies, styles, and practices”
(29). However, it also indicates “a dependence on, a continuity with, that which it follows” (29), and for
this reason, some theorists view postmodernity as an “intensification of the modern” (29-30), a new
version of modernity, or a new development within modernity. Theorists use the term postmodernity to
refer to “a dramatic rupture or break in Western history” (30) and to suggest that something new is
emerging, which requires new theories, categories, and methods to understand a new social and cultural
order.

Postmodern Theory
For Best and Kellner, “postmodern theory” typically “provides a critique of representation and
the modern belief that theory mirrors reality” (4). Postmodern theory contends that knowledge and
reality are partial, situated, and contingent and are “historically and linguistically mediated” (4).
Postmodern theory also opposes modernist notions of the “rational and unified subject” (5) favoring
instead subjects that are “socially and linguistically decentered and fragmented” (5). For Best and
Kellner, postmodern theory adopts many of the poststructuralist critiques of modern theory but at the
same time revolutionizes it. Postmodern discourses include socio-historical theories and analyze new
“cultural forms and experiences” (26). Like structuralists and poststructuralists, Best and Kellner
suggest, postmodernists privilege discourse theory, which “sees all social phenomena as structured
semiotically by codes and rules, and therefore amenable to linguistic analysis, utilizing the model of
signification and signifying practices” (26). Postmodern theory generally sees “language, signs, images,
codes, and signifying systems” (27) as entities that order “the psyche, society, and everyday life” (27).
11

Within postmodern discourses, Best and Kellner also trace two conflicting positions: those that
see postmodern discourses as positive (Drucker, Etzioni, Sontag, Hassan, Fiedler, Ferre), and those that
see postmodern discourses as negative (Toynbee, Mills, Bell, Baudrillard).

Theorists who view

postmodern discourses as positive contended that “technology and modernization” (14) helped create
breaks with the past and emphasize “difference, otherness, pleasure, novelty, and attacked reason and
hermeneutics” (15). Those who view postmodern discourses negatively argue that “new developments
of mass society and culture” (15) endanger Western society and culture. The responses of both groups,
Best and Kellner maintain, arose from changes in “contemporary capitalism . . .which was going
through an expansionist cycle and producing new commodities, abundance, and a more affluent
lifestyle” (15). Consumer culture, advertising, and media encouraged “gratification, hedonism, and the
adoption of new habits, cultural forms, and lifestyles” (15) which seemed to oppose traditional values or
to increase social control (15).
Faigley, however, suggests that “postmodern theory” emerged toward the end of the 1970s as
discourses of postmodernism entered French philosophy. Philosophers such as Julia Kristeva and JeanFrancois Lyotard continued poststructuralist criticisms of “the foundations of Western philosophy” (6),
but they also proposed it marked “a major transformation in Western thought” (7). Drawing on Jane
Flax, Faigley says that postmodern theory rejects many of the Enlightenment and modernist beliefs, such
as “‘the existence of a stable, coherent self’” (Flax qtd. in Faigley 8); the idea that reason and science
can act as “‘an objective, reliable, and universal foundation for knowledge’” (8); the idea that the
knowledge gained from reason represents a universal Truth; the idea that reason is “‘transcendent and
universal’” (8), existing independently of the subject’s location in time and place; the idea that
connections exist between “‘reason, autonomy, and freedom’” (8); the idea that knowledge is neutral;
the idea that science is the method for arriving at all True knowledge; and the idea that “‘language is
transparent’” (8). Faigley, therefore, asserts that in postmodern theory, values are contingent upon a
multiplicity of discourses. There are not universal truths, universal human experiences, or universal
human narratives.

Instead there are multiple truths, experiences and narratives, whose value is

determined by the discourse out of which they arise. Faigley concludes,
12

Postmodern theory decisively rejects the primacy of consciousness and instead has
consciousness originating in language, thus arguing that the subject is an effect rather
than a cause of discourse. Because the subject is the locus of overlapping and competing
discourses, it is a temporary stitching together of a series of often contradictory subject
positions.

In other words, what a person does, thinks, says, and writes cannot be

interpreted unambiguously because any human action does not rise out of a unified
consciousness but rather from a momentary identity that is always multiple and in some
respects incoherent. If consciousness is not fully present to one’s own self, then it cannot
be made transparent to another (9).
The three sections below present theories depicting subjects’ construction through language. In
these theories, however, language functions to order and construct subjects and their realities. It should
be noted, however, that not all the theorists presented below identify themselves as postmodernists;
however, their theories of subjectivity are important because they reflect the degree to which subjects in
postmodern theory have been constructed through language.

2.3

ALTHUSSER’S SUBJECT
Although Louis Althusser was considered a structural Marxist, his theory of subjectivity is

important because it tacitly suggests subjects are entirely constructed by language. In Ideology and
Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes Towards an Investigation, Althusser does not explicitly state that
language constructs subjectivity, but he tacitly suggests that language is a material action and practice
through which subjects convey ideological ideas and through which they construct institutions and
institutional practices. In Althusser’s notion of ontology, subjects are constituted entirely by ideologies,
but of this, subjects are unaware -- primarily because the ideologies are so common they appear
transparent. Subjects reproduce these ideologies through ideological state apparatuses, institutions such
as religion, education, the family, law, politics, trade unions, communications, and culture. Subjects
view these institutions as “world outlooks” and through them subjects “represent their real conditions of
existence to themselves” (163).

But Althusser suggests these outlooks are “imaginary and do not
13

correspond to reality” (162). Thus, ideology reflects “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their
real conditions of existence” (162). This “imaginary relationship” imbricates itself imperceptibly in all
aspects of subjects’ existence so that they “live, move and have [their] being” in ideology (171). He
therefore proposes “There is no practice except by and in an ideology” and “There is no ideology except
by the subject and for subjects” (170).
Of course, this aspect of Althusser’s theory is problematic because he presents all ideologies as
“false consciousness,” false lenses through which subjects view the world, while he presents his own
theory as being “true.” His theory also suggests he can stand outside of and be conscious of his own
ideologies and ideological practices, an idea which seems to counter his own negative view that
ideology binds subjects, who cannot separate themselves from these ideologies, which “hail,” or
“interpellate” (173) them. Nevertheless, Althusser likens this hailing to a police officer on the street
calling out “Hey, you there!” (174) Subjects feel called by the ideas of an ideology, and these ideas
address themselves to subjects’ consciousness. If subjects “turn around” when they are hailed, they
have then freely accepted that ideology, and by doing so they agree to act in certain ways, to subscribe
to certain practices, and to engage in certain rituals.
Althusser suggests ideologies always constitute acts, practices, and rituals (166), and in this way,
ideologies exist and are reproduced in a material form. He suggests, “Where only a single subject . . .is
concerned, the existence of the ideas of his belief is material in that his ideas are his material actions
inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the
material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject” (169). Thus, in Althusser’s
notion of subjectivity, subjects are entirely constructed through ideologies, and these ideologies are not
only constructed but are also reproduced through language. Language use in Althusser’s notion of
subjectivity creates associations and dissociations, as subjects choose some ideologies over others, but
language use does not help Althusser’s subjects overcome their fragmented state.
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2.4

FOUCAULT’S SUBJECT
Deriving a single theory of subjectivity from Foucault is problematic because throughout his life

and work, his notion of subjectivity developed and changed. Best and Kellner differentiate three periods
of Foucault’s work. During the 1960s, Foucault’s archaeological stage, they suggest Foucault focused
on systems of knowledge and “attempted to show that the subject is a fictitious construct” (47). In the
1970s, Foucault’s genealogical stage, Foucault focused on “modalities of power” (59) and attempted to
“foreground the material context of subject construction, to draw out the political consequences of
‘subjectification’, and to help form resistances to subjectifying practices” (47). During the 1980s, the
stage of “ethics and technologies of the self” (59), Foucault continued to investigate ideas developed in
the first two stages, but he also focused on the notion of “a self-constituting subject” (59) and began
reconsidering the subject’s “rationality and autonomy” (59).

Essentially, during this third stage,

Foucault focuses less on “technologies of domination, where subjects are dominated and objectified by
others through discourses and practices” (60), and he instead focuses on the ways in which “individuals
create their own identities through ethics and forms of self-constitution” (61). Because this study
examines subjectivity as it is constructed through language, the section presented here reflects the first
two periods of Foucault’s thinking about subjectivity rather than the later.
In the first three chapters of The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault challenges the idea that
our notion of unity and continuity exist as part of a natural order. He instead suggests that unities
(whether of objects, concepts, or statements etc.) are really disparate entities that seem unified because
they are constructed through language. For Foucault, language (in the form of statements) is an event
tied to writing, speaking, memory, and materiality and through which humans name and describe their
experiences in the world. Yet, Foucault argues that language does not merely describe an external
reality; rather, he advocates that language orders and constructs reality.
For Foucault, language creates the illusion of natural order and coherence in a chaotic world
because it presents “ready-made syntheses” (para. 3), groupings, and divisions that appear natural and
timeless – part of an already existing order of truth and knowledge-- and so we do not question them or
how they came to be even though what we consider natural changes with and depends upon the
historical constructs of which we are a part. Foucault contends that the act of naming is important
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because it creates “discursive objects” or “unities” (para. 30) that can be analyzed, and then “controlled,
selected, organized and redistributed” (“Discourse” 216) according to various rules and procedures. The
act of naming differentiates one discursive object from another and at the same time, enables it to
become part of a larger “unity” based upon its difference from other objects; its coexistence with other
statements or systems and its dependence and interrelation with them; its positioning at the same time or
after other objects or systems; and its defining of “a field of strategic possibilities” (para. 27). Foucault
calls these larger systematic orderings of “objects, types of statements, concepts, or thematic choices”
“discursive formations” (Archaeology para. 27).
For a discursive object to become part of a discursive formation, however, it must meet what
Foucault calls “rules of formation” (para. 27) – certain “conditions to which the elements of this division
(objects, mode of statements, concepts, thematic choices) are subjected” (para. 27). The conditions
discursive objects must meet are numerous and vary depending upon the discursive formation.
However, they all have “surfaces of . . . emergence” (para. 30) – differences that enable them to emerge
within certain normalizing institutions such as the family, the work place, the religious community, the
social group, and not others. These institutions may enable the object to emerge depending upon what
they will and will not tolerate, what they can and cannot designate (para. 30).
In addition, discursive objects must be legitimized by “authorities of delimitation” (para. 31) -“an institution possessing its own rules, as a group of individuals constituting the medical profession, as
a body of knowledge and practice, and an authority recognized by public opinion, the law and
government” (para. 31). They must also meet “grids of specification” (para. 32) i.e. different systems by
which they can be “divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified, derived from one another” (para.
32) as objects of discourse. They must meet historical conditions, and they exist in “complex groups of
relations” (para. 37) such as those between “institutions, economic and social processes, behavioral
patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification, modes of characterization” etc. (para. 38).
These discursive formations, and the various webs of relations in which they appear, enable discursive
objects to appear, “to juxtapose . . . [themselves] with other objects, to situate . . . [themselves] in
relation to them, to define . . . [their] difference, . . . [their] irreducibility, and even perhaps . . . [their]
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heterogeneity” (para. 38). Discursive formations, thus, limit what can be said about discursive objects.
They “determine the group of relations that discourse must establish in order to speak of this or that
object, in order to deal with them, name them, analyze them, classify them, explain them, etc.” (para.
40).
Foucault’s notion of language is important because it suggests that what subjects perceive to be
an objective, ordered reality (and continuous history or tradition) is not naturally ordered or objective.
Instead, this reality is constructed through language based upon tacit, complex networks of classification
systems, rules, and conditions, of which we are unaware. Naming systems structure what subjects know
and how they know. Even terms such as “history” are misleading because they present concepts that
appear unified and unproblematic, when in fact, they are discursive constructs whose disparate objects
are governed by specific rules, conditions, and classification systems, determined and enforced through
epistemic courts. Naming also has important implications for Foucault’s notion of subjectivity. Though
subjects have the power to name and thus classify and categorize their reality, they are equally named,
classified, and categorized by others in discursive networks.

Thus, subjects themselves become

discursive objects in a social hierarchy, and their naming determines how they are ordered in that reality,
the discursive formations that they may belong to, as well as what they can say, when, and where.
In “The Discourse on Language,” Foucault elaborates upon the ways in which language
classifies and orders knowledge and he further suggests that language functions as a means of social
control and organization, which limits what subjects can do and say. Foucault argues that discourse first
functions as a system of exclusion and societies use it prohibitively. He claims that there are usually
three kinds of prohibitions, which interact with each other in a complex web: Those prohibitions
concerning objects (or what is said about an object), those concerning ritual (or when and where
something can appropriately be said or done), and those concerning the right to speak.
Discourse also excludes by creating a system of division and rejection. Foucault says that during
the Middle Ages, how one used language determined whether one was considered insane or rational.
People were considered insane if their words and manner of speaking didn’t fit with what was
considered normal. Such individuals were termed “mad” and were thus both divided from and rejected
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by those considered “rational.” A third way discourse excludes is by creating systems of truth or
falsehood. Our notion of truth and falsehood changes through time but is dependent upon discursive
formations, with their authorities of delimitation and rules of condition, which determine what
constitutes “truth” and “knowledge,” and we base our notions of what is “true” (our will to truth) and
our notions of what constitutes knowledge (our will to knowledge) on the conditions and the
legitimizing authorities within discursive formations.
Thus, our will to truth, Foucault says, has a history of its own that dictates what students in
schools learn, the “functions of the knowing subject” (219), the history of what is taught, and the
“technical and instrumental investment in knowledge” (219). The will to truth is also supported by
institutions and is reinforced by numerous practices – by pedagogies, publishing systems, libraries, past
societies, and laboratories. It also has power over and constrains other kinds of discourse. As a result,
Foucault contends, subjects see only one truth but are unaware of how the will to truth works to exclude.
For Foucault, societies use discourse to restrict and control their members. Discourse creates rules and
boundaries that limit what subjects can say, it determines for subjects what is normal and abnormal, it
teaches them what can be considered “true” and “false,” and it determines for subjects what constitutes
“knowledge.”
Foucault also proposes other functions of discourse. He contends discourse functions to control
and delimit discourse itself. One way discourse is controlled and delimited is through “classification,
ordering, and distribution” (220). Commentaries, for example, allow subjects to speak endlessly about a
subject, but only within established conditions – one must speak about something that has already been
spoken or written about. One must therefore recycle what has been said before. Commentary enables
subjects to create an identity for themselves, but through repetition and sameness (222).
A second way discourse controls and delimits exists in the unifying function of the author. For
Foucault, an author is not a person, but rather a function that creates unity in a work and across works of
fiction. This function determines what writers can write, what they sketch out, and what they ultimately
can say. He suggests the author function limits the danger of discourse by allowing people to create
identities through the form of “individuality and the I” (222).
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Disciplines also enable subjects to construct but within certain parameters. Disciplines -- with
their “groups of objects, methods, their corpus of propositions considered to be true, the interplay of
rules and definitions, of techniques and tools” (222) -- create an “anonymous system” (222) open to
anyone, but with the condition that new statements can be made. But the statements that one makes
must meet certain conditions. Foucault says, “The proposition must refer to a specific range of objects .
. . is obliged to utilize conceptual instruments and techniques of a well-defined type . . . [and] must fit
into a certain type of theoretical field” (223). Before a statement can be considered “true” it must meet
certain conditions. As a result, disciplines control the production of discourse and fix its limits “through
the action of an identity taking the form of a permanent reactivation of the rules” (224).
To summarize briefly, Foucault sees language as a system that creates discursive objects. These
objects are classified and ordered, and become part of discursive formations which create how subjects
perceive their reality. At the same time, language constructs subjects through systems of objectification,
exclusion, limitation, and control. Discourse functions as a system of exclusion because it prohibits
what subjects can say, it limits when/where/and how subjects can speak, and it limits which subjects
have the right to speak. Subjects are also constructed (and become subjected) as they name and classify
themselves and are named and classified by others through language. The act of naming (which also
turns subjects into objects) thus influences how others perceive them, how they perceive themselves,
how they are ordered hierarchically within society, and whether or not they are accepted or rejected by
that society.
The act of naming also enables numerous subject positions. At the same time, discursive
formations and systems of power inherent in them determine what subjects consider true and false and
what constitutes knowledge. Discursive forms and practices enable subjects to speak, but at the same
time control what they can say. Subjects can create subjectivities for themselves through language –
through repetition and sameness, through the unifying author function, or by association with certain
disciplines, rituals, fellowships, and doctrines –but they can do so only to a certain extent: they must
follow the rules inherent in discursive formations and discursive practices. As a result, subjects are also
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subjected through language, which is imbricated in power relations. Thus, Best and Kellner argue that
for Foucault,
In any society, discourse is power because the rules determining discourse enforce norms
of what is rational, sane, or true, and to speak from outside these rules is to risk
marginalization and exclusion. All discourses are produced by power but they are not
wholly subservient to it and can be used as ‘a point of resistance and a starting point for
an opposing strategy. (57-8)
Foucault’s notion of subjectivity, unlike Althusser’s, does provide subjects with some agency –
but that agency is limited; it is always contingent upon rules governing discourse and social institutions
which construct subjects and which delimit what they can say and do. Although Foucault seems to
provide some space of self, this space seems forever imbricated in discursive constructions, from which
subjects can never free themselves. Their greatest possibility for realization can come only through the
power of imagining. In “The Subject and Power,” for instance, Foucault suggests that subjects must
independently “. . . refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid
of this kind of political ‘double bind,’ which is the simultaneous individualization and totalization of
modern power structures” (785). Foucault’s notion of discourse also seems somewhat rigid – dividing
language users as much as it attempts to unify them as objects in discursive formations. It allows for
little, if any, originality, as all discourse created is governed by some kind of rule governing a discursive
formation.

2.5

FOSTER’S SUBJECT
Unlike Althusser and Foucault’s more limited notion of subjectivity, Helen Foster’s Networked

Process: Dissolving Boundaries of Process and Post-Process provides a richer notion of the subject –
one who, though constructed largely through language, does have a unique space of self and therefore
has some degree of agency. In her notion of subjectivity, Foster draws on the linguistic philosophies of
Mikhail Bakhtin to position subjects in “an imbricated relationship with discourse, others, and the
world” (78).

Foster builds upon her theory of networked subjectivity by describing it in layers:
20

“Space/Time/History” (81), “Language and Discourse” (82), “Self” (89), “Alterity/Other/Horizon” (99),
and “Addressivity/Answerability” (104).
Foster first grounds her theory of subjectivity by situating subjects in space, time, and history.
Drawing on Einstein’s theory of relativity, she argues that though subjects’ “perception of time is
relative” (82)—dependent upon shared constructs of time created through calendars, clocks, or “shared
events” (82) -- their relation to space is absolute because no two subjects can occupy the same exact
space. This aspect of Foster’s theory is very important. Because subjects cannot occupy the same space,
how subjects perceive others as well as their own experiences differs and is therefore unique. Foster thus
provides subjects with a unique space of self that neither Althusser nor Foucault acknowledge. This
aspect of Foster’s theory is also important because unlike other postmodern accounts of subjectivity
which claim existence is meaningless because subjectivities are constructed entirely through language,
power structures inherent in that language, or consumer culture and visual practices over which subjects
have little control, Foster’s theory maintains existence is meaningful precisely because no two people
can ever share the same space and thus their experiences must differ. These differences create spaces
where meaning-making can occur, and for Foster language makes existence meaningful. Subjects exist
in rhetorical networks with others that help them to understand their “relationships to . . . [themselves]
and to the world” (85). Foster’s theory of subjectivity, then, is based heavily on the theories of Bakhtin.
In her section on “Language/Discourse,” Foster appropriates major concepts in Bakhtin’s theory
of language. According to Foster, Bakhtin was interested in “the utterance, which he equates to an
event, a deed, an action, and which is produced through a sort of language that we would now
characterize as discourse” (85). Language, for Bakhtin, was characterized by a quality he called
heteroglossia, which he described as follows:
Language is not an abstract system of normative forms but rather a concrete heteroglot
conception of the world. All words have the ‘taste’ of a profession, a genre, a tendency, a
party, a particular work, a particular person, a generation, an age group, the day and hour.
Each word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life;
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all words and forms are populated by intentions.

Contextual overtones (generic,

tendentious, individualistic) are inevitable in the word. (Bakhtin qtd. in Foster 85)
Foster proposes, then, that the language that comes to subjects is heteroglossic – filled with the
ideologies and intentions of everyone who has ever used it; language is thus entirely social. However,
she suggests that language is also thoroughly political because subjects must grapple with it to make it
meet their own intentions. In describing this struggle, Foster draws from Bakhtin’s theory of language
use, “which posits that language is characterized by degrees of sameness and difference. The pole of
sameness is monologic, which functions as a centripetal force within discourse and which Bakhtin says
represents the discourse of religion, the state, or the parent” (Foster 85). Monologism attempts to keep
language and meaning the same, resisting change.

For this reason, Foster, citing Todorov, says,

“Monologue, then, ignores the other, pretending to be ‘the last word,’ which is why ‘to some extent it
objectivizes all reality’” (Foster 85; Todorov 107).
The opposite pole of language use, dialogism, functions as a centrifugal force within discourse,
enabling words to take on the meanings of anyone who has used them. However, Foster also suggests
that neither monologism nor dialogism is absolute, for language can neither stay entirely the same
always nor continually change its meaning. Rather, she contends, as subjects grapple with language to
suit their intentions, a ratio always exists between monologistic tendencies and dialogistic tendencies,
and this ratio is always dependent on the rhetorical situation in which subjects exist. The struggle to
make discourse serve intention is a political act. Discourse, for Foster, as for Bakhtin, is thoroughly
social and political.
Due to the paradox of placement or situatedness, Foster, following Bakhtin, maintains that each
utterance is (theoretically) unique. This utterance, itself heteroglossic, is ultimately important because it
functions to “[mediate] between opposing forces in language, this mediation constitutes an act, it can
never be fully exhausted, and it works to constantly reconceptualize the word [discourse]” (88).
Therefore, language is important in shaping the subject because as Foster says, it is “that which comes to
the subject from the world, 2) that with which the subject must grapple to make meaning, and 3) that
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which the subject struggles to approximate to its own intentions, as it speaks to the world and, in the
process, makes its own contribution to the rich heteroglot nature of discourse” (85).
According to Foster, subjects through discourse and discursive interaction with others must
“impose order and form on their lives, an architectonic act that can be accomplished only through
dialogic mediation” (87). It is through this dialogic interaction– through the grappling with monologic
and dialogic tendencies in language -- that subjects can create meaning and impose order on their lives.
This notion in Foster’s theory of subjectivity –that subjects must struggle with language to appropriate
and create meaning -- also differs from the theories of Althusser and Foucault, whose subjects seem to
use language less problematically. Although Foucault does indicate that power relations imbricate
themselves in discourse, he does not account for subjects’ use of that language, and this may be because
he ascribes subjects little agency.
In addition, unlike Althusser and Foucault, who provide relatively no space of ‘self,’ Foster’s
section on “Self” counters the notion that language entirely constructs subjects. She argues that though
subjects are created in large part through language and through conditions of sameness, some element of
difference must exist for subjects to have agency. How much agency they have, however, “depends
upon the degree of mediation each subject is able to accomplish within the historical, cultural contexts
of their physical lives” (90). Foster also proposes, like Bakhtin, that consciousness is created through
language and that we exist before we develop consciousness. In attempting to explain this, Foster
quotes Bakhtin, who says,
All that touches me comes to my consciousness – beginning with my name – from the
outside world, passing through the mouths of others (from the mother, etc.), with their
intonation, their affective tonality, and their values. At first I am conscious of myself
only through others: they give me the words, the forms, and the tonality that constitute
my first image of myself . . . . Just as the body is initially formed in the womb of the
mother (in her body), so human consciousness awakens surrounded by the consciousness
of others. (Bakhtin qtd. in Foster 91)
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According to Foster, subjects do not just receive language from others, but because they have
some agency, they must also appropriate it “to mediate the gap between subjects” (92). Foster says
The gap [between subjects] emerges because subjects cannot simultaneously inhabit the
same space, cannot experience time uniformly, and cannot eradicate the gap between
inner and outer self. Existence, according to Bakhtin, is not a given or a privilege.
Because this appropriation is marked by struggle, and because language precedes and
constitutes consciousness, consciousness is itself thoroughly dialogic. (92)
Thus, for Foster, language becomes the means through which subjects can bridge gaps between
self/other and between inner/outer self. Subjects’ attempts to appropriate language, however, are not
unproblematic. Subjects cannot control the “social and political contexts that surround language, that is,
heteroglossia” (92), so subjects must struggle when trying to “make the word serve the deed or event”
(92), an act which we are usually only partially successful in achieving. A second problem is related to
the appropriation of the word “I” and the limited perspective that each person’s situatedness in space
provides. That is, each subject is the center of the universe because each subject, paradoxically, speaks
from the same linguistic position of the “I” but from different positions in space. Subjects can never
know the perspectives of other subjects because they cannot meet everyone in the world and because
even if they did, discourse does not entirely match intentions. Therefore, because so much of subjects’
self-knowledge comes to them through the act of alterity, they can never achieve wholeness. There will
always be a part of each subject that remains unarticulated because subjects cannot see themselves as
objects, i.e. as others see them.
Foster notes, “while the ‘I’ is the subject’s only alternative to assume totality, it is also inherently
marked by limitation, which insures that the self can never completely coincide with itself” (92). A gap,
therefore, exists between one’s inner and outer self.

However, Foster suggests that refusing to

“appropriate the ‘I’” (93) is a refusal to “assume its responsibility to itself, to an assumption of its ethical
position relative to the world” (93). Refusing to appropriate the “I” therefore prevents a dialogic
relation with oneself or others and is a “closing in of consciousness, which is equivalent to a monologic
relationship with one’s self” (93).
24

According to Foster, words mediate the gaps between one’s inner and outer self as well as
between self and other. She says,
Words, Bakhtin says, although they receive the categorical distinction of being either one
subject’s or another’s, live on the boundary between subjects. This boundary, due to
dialogic struggle, is constantly in flux, because language is “not a neutral medium that
passes freely and easily into the private property of the speaker’s intentions [because] it is
populated – overpopulated – with the intentions of others.” (Bakhtin qtd. in Foster 93)
Words alone, however, are not enough to mediate the gaps between self and other, and
inner/outer self. According to Foster, subjects also need “responsive understanding” (93-94) as opposed
to “shallow understanding (94). Foster, again drawing from Bakhtin, describes the differences between
responsive and shallow understanding in this way:
Defined as “an exact and passive reflexion, of a redoubling of the other’s experience
within me,” shallow understanding serves as a bridge to active, responsive understanding,
which, Bakhtin says, is “a matter of translating the experience into an altogether different
axiological perspective, into new categories of evaluation and formulation” (qtd. in
Todorov 22). “Responsive understanding is a fundamental force,” he says, “one that
discourse senses as resistance or support enriching the discourse” (Art 280-81). Because
active,

responsive

understanding

also

requires

evaluation,

Bakhtin

considers

understanding and evaluation as constituting “a unified integral act” (Speech 142).
Active understanding, then, promotes dialogism in that it reveals the “multiplicity of [. . .
the utterance’s] meaning” and acts as a supplement that “continues creativity” (142).
“The object [consciousness] is [thus] created in the process of creativity” (120), which
explains the necessity of the self’s participation in dialogic struggle. (Foster 94)
Foster indicates that one’s consciousness – one’s subjectivity -- is created not just through one’s
struggle with and appropriation of discourse, but also through responsive understanding. Discourse, as
well as responsive understanding, constitute an act of creation through which subjects create themselves
and others. Subjects cannot become “unified totalities” (94) because these acts ensure subjects are
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always in the process of becoming as they discover themselves. Thus, they can never “‘exist in full’”
(Bakhtin qtd in Foster 94).
For Foster, being is an ethical responsibility. Life is dialogical, and subjects have an ethical
responsibility not only to create themselves through acts of dialogism and responsive understanding but
to help others do this also. Quoting Todorov, she suggests, “‘To live means to engage in dialogue, to
question, to listen, to answer, to agree etc.’” (Foster 95; Todorov 97). Citing Bakhtin, too, she suggests,
“‘for the word (and, consequently, for a human being) there is nothing more terrible than a lack of
response’” (Foster 95; Bakhtin Speech 127).
Also important in Foster’s notion of subjectivity is the notion of alterity, for it is only through
others that subjects can come to know themselves. Although the language of others first gives the
subject consciousness, subjects ultimately must grapple with language and appropriate it to their own
purposes to make meaning. But Foster, quoting Bakhtin, suggests that words always belong to more
than just one person. Bakhtin suggests,
Language, for the individual consciousness, lies on the borderline between oneself and
the other. The word in language is half someone else’s. It becomes ‘one’s own’ only
when the speaker populates it with his own intentions, his own accent, when he
appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intentions. Prior to
this moment of appropriation, the word does not exist in a neutral and impersonal
language (it is not, after all, out of a dictionary that the speaker gets his words!), but
rather it exists in other people’s mouths, in other people’s contexts, serving other
people’s intentions: it is from there that one must take the word and make it one’s own.
(qtd. in Foster 100-101)
Further, because subjects occupy unique spaces and places in time, they perceive themselves and
the world from their own “centers” (101). Because they view the world and everything in it from their
own situatedness, they cannot perceive themselves as objects in the world, and, therefore, they cannot
mediate the gaps between their inner/outer self and between self/other. As a result, subjects must rely
on others’ vision to mediate what they know about themselves and what they know about others.
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According to Foster, subjects must do this because in different contexts there are always things that
subjects cannot see about themselves and about the context. Subjects must therefore rely on what others
can see about themselves and about the context that subjects alone cannot. Foster notes that Bakhtin
calls this “a surplus of seeing” (101). Subjects can only “see” themselves by appropriating the vision of
others that occurs through discourse and responsive understanding. According to Foster, Bakhtin argues
that each person has a unique “horizon” (102) – a “place of perception” (102), which “constitutes the
context from which the subject authors his/her utterances” (102). Because subjects’ experiences are
shaped by different horizons, subjects ultimately need each other to achieve self-consciousness and to
exist as subjects.
In Foster’s notion of subjectivity, there is one final component: the notion of addressivity and
answerability. Because subjects have a unique horizon and a surplus of vision, they are called by the
world or “addressed by the world” (104) to account for their own position in it. Foster says, “Each
subject is addressed and thus compelled to author its unique position in space, in the world. No subject
can answer for another nor can any subject abdicate, for a refusal to answer nevertheless constitutes an
answer. Bakhtin refers to this necessity of the subject to author its position as having no alibi in
existence” (105). Answerability, Foster maintains, is a performance through which subjects can create
meaning. Yet it is also more than this. She argues subjects have an ethical responsibility to author their
positions in the world. Answerability constitutes a social, political, and ethical act because it “envelops
the meaning and value we impose on our existence” (106). As Foster says, “Existence is neither a given
nor a privilege but a responsibility of the subject to author itself both for itself and for the world.
Existence, then, is dialogic, in that answerability represents the mediation between the gap of subject
and the world” (107).
Although Athusser, Foucault, and Foster suggest that discourse constructs subjects, there are
several remarkable and important differences among them. Perhaps most important is their differing
views of language’s role in constructing subjects. For Foster, gaps between people exist because of
different situated positions in the world. She thus views language as a means to bridge the gaps between
people, and through a surplus of vision to help subjects bridge the gap between inner and outer self.
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Language is also a creative act that subjects engage in (and struggle with) to create meaning for
themselves and to help others create meaning for themselves.

Further, subjects have an ethical

responsibility to themselves, to others, and to the world in which they live to share their unique horizons,
for only in this way can they help others in their own process of becoming.
For Foucault and Althusser, language does not serve these functions. Language does construct
subjects, but it does not help subjects discover ‘who they are.’ Rather, language seems to impede
Althusser and Foucault’s subjects in this endeavor. Althusser’s subjects, for instance, are oblivious
altogether to the ways in which language creates ideologies that construct them. While Foucault’s
subjects may be conscious of the extent of their construction through language, their own language use
cannot free them from its confines because language is already too imbricated in relations of power that
are partly responsible for constructing the subjects. Subjects’ language use, then, only entangles them in
deeper webs of discursive relations.
In addition, Foster’s notion of subjectivity enables subjects a greater sense of agency than either
Foucault or Althusser’s subjects. Perhaps even more importantly for this study, Foster’s notion of
responsive understanding provides a space, too, for questioning silence’s role in shaping subjectivity, a
space that neither Foucault nor Althusser acknowledge. For this reason, I will use Foster’s notion of
subjectivity as a ground in Chapter 4 to suggest ways in which silence could be added to a notion of
subjectivity.
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Chapter 3: Theories of Silence
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Silence is often defined and perceived negatively as an emptiness, as a nothingess, as an absence,
or as an unpleasant gap separating subjects engaged in communication. This conceptualization of
silence resonates with many postmodern views of silence.

In Reclaiming the Tacit Dimension:

Symbolic Form in the Rhetoric of Silence, George Kalamaras asserts, “in the wake of poststructuralist
theory, the concept of silence has become synonymous with psychic death . . . . silence is most often
represented as a condition the speaking subjects must overcome, an abyss or lack that inhibits one’s
power to make meaning” (1). However, current scholarship indicates that silence is more than a gap
between words, an absence of sound, or a deficiency in communication. Instead, it suggests silence is
polysemous, with multiple forms and functions that work both alone and alongside discourse to create
meaning. This chapter overviews some of the scholarship on silence, suggests ways silence tacitly (and
sometimes explicitly) constructs subjects, and advocates for the inclusion of silence in theories of
subjectivity that have been grounded in language.

3.1.2

Theorizing Silence
In Organizing Silence: A World of Possibilities, Robin Patric Clair, citing M. van Manen,

suggests scholars have typically examined silence using three methods: the ontological approach, the
epistemological approach, and the literal approach (6). Clair, however, maintains we must examine
silence ideologically, and Cheryl Glenn’s Unspoken: A Rhetoric of Silence advances a rhetorical
approach. This parsing of silence into categories is problematic, of course, because each approach, from
a rhetorical perspective, is rhetorical. It makes sense, then, that silence would function in multiple
ways, and its meanings would depend, to a great extent, on the contexts in which it was studied in
addition to how subjects perceived and interpreted that silence. In addition, in rhetorical situations,
silence does not fit into neat categories; instead, it functions in ways that may be simultaneously
ontological, epistemological, ideological, and literal; thus, silence like language is thoroughly
ideological and rhetorical.
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However, because the theories of subjectivity presented in the previous chapter privilege
language, primarily, on grounds that it is ontological, epistemological, ideological, and imbricated in
power relations, Clair’s early categorization of silence may be useful here, for it illustrates that silence,
too, can be ontological, epistemological, ideological, and imbricated in power relations. Examining
silence through different rhetorical lenses will reveal how silence functions like (and with) language, but
it will also reveal how silence functions in important ways to construct subjectivity. Thus, while this
study uses many of the same theorists cited in Glenn’s Unspoken, it differs from Glenn’s approach.
While Glenn builds upon theorists to suggest that silence is gendered and rhetorical, this study builds
upon many of the same theorists to suggest that silence is not just thoroughly rhetorical but it is
thoroughly ontological.

3.2 SILENCE AS ONTOLOGICAL
Clair, citing van Manen, defines the ontological approach as “‘the silence of Being or Life
itself’” (6). According to Thomas Brueneau, the silence of Being “refers to a mode of existence where
silence does not refer to absence, but rather to the manner in which reality has its existence”
(“Communicative Silences” 23). Ontological theories, then, examine silence as a phenomenon that
constitutes our reality. They examine what silence is, how it exists, and the ways subjects experience it.
Max Picard’s early philosophical treatise, The World of Silence, for example, defines silence this
way:
Silence is an autonomous phenomenon. It is therefore not identical with the suspension
of language. It is not merely the negative condition that sets in when the positive is
removed; it is rather an independent whole, subsisting in and through itself. It is creative,
as language is creative; and it is formative of human beings as language is formative, but
not to the same degree. (15)
Early in his text, Picard presents silence as thoroughly imbricated in subjects’ existence, and he
depicts silence using two metaphors: silence as container and silence as substance. Picard first presents
silence as a Force containing all other phenomena. He suggests, “Silence is the first born of the basic
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phenomena. It envelopes the other basic phenomenon” (21). Later, he also says, “[Silence] is a primary,
objective reality, which cannot be traced back to anything else. It cannot be replaced by anything else; it
cannot be exchanged with anything else. There is nothing behind it to which it can be related except the
Creator Himself” (21). Yet, Picard also presents silence as a Substance existing in subjects and all other
things, as when he says, “There is also more silence in one person than can be used in a single human
life” (21). Using these two metaphors, Picard argues silence imbricates itself in every aspect of the
world and being, and the remaining chapters of his book ruminate upon the many ways silence is
ontological. Picard, for instance, contends silence connects humans to their present, past and future; it
assists them in communicating with the Divine; it possesses healing and restorative power; it is
primordial – what humans came from and what they will return to when they die; it grounds language
and gives fullness to a word’s meaning; it permeates Nature; and it conveys Truth, Beauty, Love,
Knowledge, Loyalty, and Forgiveness, i.e. silence is deeply imbricated in human existence and in
everything humans do, create, or are part of.
Like the theories of language presented in the previous chapter, Picard’s theory of silence
implies a particular kind of subject – one, in fact, that at first seems remarkably Cartesian. He depicts
silence as a primordial, generative, transcendent force existing as part of an external reality that connects
humans to the world around them, and that – like some kind of Holy Spirit – exists within them. He
says, for example, “Where silence is, man is observed by silence. Silence looks at man more than man
looks at silence. Man does not put silence to the test; silence puts man to the test” (17). Despite this
transcendent nature, however, Picard suggests humans can know silence – not through reason or
reflection, necessarily, but through perception and the human spirit. He says, for example, “Silence is
not visible, and yet its existence is clearly apparent. It extends to the farthest distances, yet it is so close
to us that we can feel it concretely as we feel our own bodies. It is intangible, yet we can feel it as
directly as we feel materials and fabrics” (18). Through silence, Picard’s subject possesses a great
potential for agency because “Silence gives to things inside it something of the power of its own
autonomous being” (19). This power of silence, he says, allows subjects to endure more if it exists
within them.
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Up to this point, Picard suggests silence is subjectivity. It exists outside subjects and within
them. It is a life force that creates and sustains them. It is a pure, untainted phenomenon. Yet, as the
world of noise encroaches on the subject, Picard argues, the subject loses both its subjectivity and its
agency. Speech, Picard claims, has become corrupted and contributes to the world of noise. He says,
Language has become a mere mechanical vehicle transporting the outward signs of
language . . . Words have become merely signs that something is being fetched out of the
jumble of noise and thrown at the listener. The word is not specifically a word. It can
now be replaced by signs – colour signs or sound signs; it has become an apparatus, and
like every mere apparatus it is always facing the possibility of destruction. And therefore
the man who does not live directly from the word, but allows himself to be dragged along
by the apparatus of noise also faces destruction at any moment. (175).
Picard views noise as a technology that has “seduced” (184) humans and that has determined
them. While Baudrillard attributes humans’ objectification to consumption of new media and digital
technologies, Picard, who wrote his treatise in 1948, attributes the loss of agency to the radio. He
suggests, “Radio fills everything and produces everything – all human feeling and wishing and knowing,
and even man himself as a person. Man is produced by the radio . . . . And it establishes the relationship
not the person” (200-201). For Picard, therefore, the potential for human agency lies in silence not in
language. If subjects can only harness silence, which he sees as dormant in humans, they will also
harness the capacity to think for themselves and feel connected to that which exists around them. One
might assert, however, that the silence conceptualized by Picard exists apart from current technologies,
which, like the radio, have become “apparatuses” characterized by “noise” (i.e. the meaningless chatter
of social networking sites or the profusion of language-based information etc.) that distract subjects
from connecting with their inner silences or with the silences of Nature surrounding them.
While Picard’s theory of silence does illuminate the degree to which silence inhabits our lives
and our world, it is not systematic, and it over privileges silence’s place in constructing our realities and
subjectivities. Inspired by Picard, Bernard Dauenhauer’s Silence: The Phenomenon and Its Ontological
Significance, presents a more systematic theory of silence, grounded in phenomenology and the theories
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of Husserl and Heiddegger. Unlike Picard, Dauenhauer structures his theoretical analysis of silence
around two guiding questions: “What is silence? And what is its ontological significance?” (viii).
Dauenhauer, next, develops a theory of silence, as well as a list of silence’s essential characteristics,
from his own theory of ontology. Dauenhauer states his main premise this way:
Both man and world are syntheses of two irreducible, but non-self-standing components
which are not contraries of one another. Rather, these components are simply other than
one another. Being is the interplay of the play of these two components in man on the
one hand and the world on the other. Nothing, neither man nor thing, can either be or be
intelligible except proximately by virtue of the play of these components, and ultimately
by virtue of the interplay of the several plays of these components. The components of
this synthesis, this dyad, are appropriately named the ‘determinate’ and the
‘nondeterminate.’ (142-143)
This synthesis of the determinate and nondeterminate cannot be settled into a perfect whole. But
Dauenhauer says that this interplay between the determinate and nondeterminate exists in every aspect
of the world and in every aspect of being, particularly in human actions, creations, and significations,
which humans use to mediate their existence with their world. The act of managing a business, he says,
requires decisions and pauses in those decisions. The act of deciding and pausing manifests the
interplay of stabilizing and nonstabilizing elements– of determinateness and nondeterminateness.
Human creations, too, engage in this interplay. Constructing a building “involves both a manipulation of
materials . . . and a yielding to the constraints imposed by those materials” (148). In the signitive1
domain this interplay between the determinate and the nondeterminate manifests itself through discourse
and silence. However, Dauenhauer cautions readers not to associate nondeterminateness with silence or
determinatenss with discourse because both may reveal determinate and nondeterminate components.

1

Dauenhauer never explicitly defines what he means by “signitive domain.” He indicates only that the signitive domain is “a
domain through which man mediates his encounter with being” (107). He suggests that in order for meaning to be made
manifest, humans must be both “an initiator and a respondent” (107) and he says “the meaning of being itself cannot be
made manifest except through both initiative and responsiveness on the part of man. If this is the case, and if discourse and
silence are not correlative opposites but are inextricably intertined [sic], then each of them enters into the constitution of both
initiative and responsiveness. . . . . which is required for man to manifest the meaning of being” (107). It is understood here,
then, to mean that aspect of human existence involving meaning-making, particularly through discourse and silence.
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As a result, Dauenhauer’s depiction of silence differs greatly from Picard’s. While Picard views silence
as an autonomous phenomenon, Dauenhauer views silence as a positive, “active performance” (4) that
continually engages in an interplay of stability and instability with discourse. Further, this tension is
necessary for subjects to signitively mediate their existence in the world, and therefore, silence is
thoroughly imbricated in subjects’ existence.
Dauenhauer further establishes silence as an authentic component in this interplay (rather than as
one merely derived from language) by attributing to silence its own forms, functions, and tempos, and
by suggesting that silence operates differently with different discourses. Dauenhauer categorizes silence
into distinct forms, which function differently and contain their own tempos. He distinguishes, for
example, between intervening silences, fore-and-after silences, and deep silences. Intervening silences
“punctuate words and phrases of a spoken sentence” (6) and function melodically and rhythmically. In
its melodic function, intervening silence performs a “closing-opening operation” that “terminates one
sound phrase and . . . clears the way for the next” (6-7), thus serving “the sound phrases it punctuates”
(7). The “number, placement, and duration” (7) of the silences, Dauenhauer says, establish rhythm, and
create dramatic and lexical effects (7).
A second form of silence, fore-and-after silence, surrounds entire utterances. Fore-silences come
before utterances and are sometimes difficult to detect. Yet when “one experiences that an utterance has
been begun without sufficient ‘open space’ for it,” he suggests, “a certain wrenching is experienced,”
signaling a fore-silence (11).

Fore-silences are also experienced as “occurrences of anticipatory

alertness” (11), during which listeners prepare themselves to hear something new or novel (11).
Conversely, after-silence closes utterances. It involves “savoring” (12), which includes remembering
and imagining as well as integrating “the just concluded utterance with previous utterances and other
possible utterances” (12). Utterances, themselves, distinguish one form of silence from another.
A third form of silence is deep silence – the kind of silence privileged over speech between
intimates and during religious worship – as a space “opened for God’s activity” (19). It also occurs
during the silence of the To-Be-Said – a “silence beyond all saying, the silence of the what-ought-to-besaid in which what-is-said is embedded” (19).
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How silence functions, however, also depends on the discourse type and the participants in the
discussion.

Again, Dauenhauer differentiates between interlocutor-centered (or audience-centered)

discourse, characteristic of discourse with family, friends, and acquaintances – and topic-centered (or
subject-centered) discourse, characteristic of scientific, technological, moral, political, religious, and
artistic discourses. As just one example, Dauenhauer suggests, for instance, that after-silences among
acquaintances are different from the after-silences among family or friends. He says,
The after-silence at the end of a string of utterances belonging to familial discourse or to
discourse among friends suspends but does not terminate the discourse . . . . But the aftersilence in which a particular set of utterances among acquaintances terminates carries the
sense of bringing the dialogue to a full stop. The dialogue is not suspended. It is
finished. (31)
In addition, silences related to topic-centered discourses differ in form and function, and
participating in one kind of discourse requires participants to “be silent in” (33) other kinds of discourse.
Again, as just one example, Dauenhauer suggests scientific discourse “assumes an objective universe
which science endeavors to describe and explain . . . . it has no privileged moments and. . . it is
concerned with abstract, general objects” (34). The silence linked to this kind of discourse, then,
requires participants to “set aside” everything that makes them individuals (35). Doing so joins the
scientific community together. He argues, “the silence which opens the way for scientific discourse . .
.in the final analysis, [is] neither mine nor yours, . . . . The utterances, in principle, simply employ the
scientist as a mouthpiece” (35). While Dauenhauer provides numerous other examples, he ultimately
arrives at five essential characteristics of silence, which establish it as a separate component engaging in
an interplay with speech:
(1) Silence is a founded, active intentional performance which is required for the concrete
clarification of the sense of intersubjectivity, (2) It does not directly intend an already
fully determinate object of any sort. Rather, motivated by finitude and awe, (3) silence
interrupts an ‘and so forth’ of some particular stream of intentional performances which
intend determinate objects of some already specified sort. As such, (4) silence is not the
35

correlative opposite of discourse, but rather establishes and maintains an oscillation or
tension among the several levels of discourse and between the domain of discourse and
the domains of nonpredictive experience. (82)
Importantly, Dauenhauer indicates, here, like Picard, that subjects exist in spaces of discourse and
silence. Unlike Picard, however, Dauenhauer also asserts silence and discourse must exist together –
must maintain tension between each other for meaning making to occur and for intersubjectivity, itself,
to exist.
As a result, Dauenhauer’s theory of silence positions subjects in an unstable reality, where
stability and instability exist in constant tension with each other. For Dauenhauer, it is this tension that
pervades all things and creates our reality. This tension exists in the world and within subjects. It is
manifested in their actions, creations, and significations. While Dauenhauer does not accord silence the
sublime status that Picard does, Dauenhauer does privilege silence by suggesting that subjects cannot
create meaning without it. Silence, to some extent, constructs how subjects create meaning because the
meaning created depends in part on the form silence takes as it functions with discourse. This form also
tacitly helps to construct the relationships between people. Silences, working with discourse, bind
people together or separate them. And this oscillation between language and silence allows subjects to
intervene in their world and in the lives of each other. Subjects through the interplay of language and
silence as well as determinate and nondeterminate elements, are never entirely constructed or
fragmented from each other. Unlike Picard’s subjects, who lose agency because of imbalances between
speech and silence, the oscillation between language and silence in Dauenhauer’s subjects creates a kind
of counter-balance enabling subjects to act, create, and be in a fundamentally unstable, unknowable
world.
In these two ontological theories of silence, Picard and Dauenhauer tacitly suggest that it is
subjects’ relation not just to speech but also to silence which determines the extent to which they are
constructed and the degree of agency they have. For Picard and Dauenhauer silence is central for any
degree of agency, a notion that epistemological theories will share.
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One criticism of Dauenhauer’s work should be noted here, however. Adam Jaworski’s The
Power of Silence: Social and Pragmatic Perspectives criticizes Dauenhauer’s analysis as essentialist
because Dauenhauer supposes that one can “really know” (32) what silence is and can distill essential
characteristics of silence by systematically categorizing and studying it; Jaworski argues that
determining the essence of silence is impossible and looking for essences often leads to never ending
definitions. He says, “Dauenhauer’s book seems to ramble on in search of the true meaning of silence
only to conclude at the end that the book has failed to achieve its primary goal and that it probably can
never be achieved” (33). Instead, Jaworski argues for a nonessentialist, sociopragmatic approach to
silence – one which views concepts like silence as “prototypes” that have “indiscrete categories,” i.e.
“fuzzy edges” (31), and one which views silence “as a component of various communicative situations
and as a tool of communicative expression” (34).

3.3 SILENCE AS EPISTEMOLOGICAL
Epistemological approaches to silence view silence as a means through which subjects build
knowledge about the world, although again, epistemological and ontological categories are never
discrete. According to Clair, this approach is founded on the work of Michel Polanyi’s philosophy of
tacit knowing. She says,
Tacit knowledge is the phenomenon of knowing without being able to articulate what we
know. At times, we may discover that we are unable to articulate an experience, but
others are capable of expressing it for us. At other times, the experience simply cannot
be described in everyday language. . . . Finally, van Manen (1990) suggests that the
unspeakable aspects may only be temporary and as time passes we may be able to
express the experience or knowledge. (6)
While Clair’s description of tacit knowing is important, in Knowing and Being, Polanyi
emphasizes several other points. In his chapters, “Knowing and Being” and “The Logic of Tacit
Inference,” Polanyi argues that what we know depends not just on our frame of reference, our past
experiences, our conceptual knowledge, or our application of that knowledge through practice. What we
37

know also depends on how our senses perceive, assimilate, and interpret stimuli outside the body and
present that information to us in a unified way, shaping what we (think we) know, and creating a
framework for future reference against which we may measure new stimuli. As we perceive objects, our
senses also attend to two kinds of sensory clues, both of which “contribute to the apparent reality of the
object on which [our] attention is focused” (140). Subliminal clues, Polanyi says, are those that “we
cannot experience in themselves” (140). These clues seem to be internal and unobservable, such as “the
contraction of [our] eye muscles or the stirring inside [our] labyrinth organ” (140). We also attend to
marginal clues, those that we could observe if we wanted to but that we normally only see “from the
corner of [our] eye” (140). Polanyi says that although we may not be aware of these processes because
they occur silently and we cannot observe them or justify them, they “endow a thing with meaning by
interiorizing it” (146). For Polanyi, we rely on our bodies for “all knowledge and thought” (147). He
says,
Our body is the only assembly of things known almost exclusively by relying on our
awareness of them for attending to something else. Parts of our body serve as tools for
observing objects outside and for manipulating them. Every time we make sense of the
world, we rely on tacit knowledge of impacts made by the world on our body and the
complex responses of our body to these impacts. (Logic 147-148)
While Polanyi argues that explicit direction, knowledge, and thought is important, he also
suggests that it can be “ineffectual” (144). In learning to balance on a bicycle, for example, Polanyi
suggests, we must rely on tacit knowledge. Explicit direction about balancing – i.e. information such as,
“in order to compensate for a given angle of imbalance a, we must take a curve on the side of the
imbalance, of which the radius (r) should be proportionate to the square of the velocity (v) over the
imbalance: r~v2/a” (144) -- is useless when one actually tries to balance. As a result, Polanyi says that
knowledge cannot entirely be explicit. He suggests instead that explicit knowledge depends upon, or is
always “rooted in” tacit knowledge (144). For Polanyi language is just an extension of “our bodily
equipment” (148) – a tool through which we “make ourselves aware” (148). He says, “Such extensions
of ourselves develop new faculties in us; our whole education operates in this way; as each of us
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interiorizes our cultural heritage, he grows into a person seeing the world and experiencing life in terms
of this outlook” (148).
Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing, then, presents a very different kind of subject than the theories
of Picard or Dauenhauer. While Picard presented a subject fallen from the purity of silence and entirely
determined by noise, and Dauenhauer presented a subject engaged in a tension between language and
silence to create meaning, Polanyi privileges subjects’ tacit ability to know the world through the silent
operations of the senses. Although Polanyi’s subjects cannot know their world entirely – because he
suggests all knowledge is partial and dependent upon one’s place, one’s perceptions, and the
interpretation of those perceptions – subjects’ perceptions enable them to “know more than they think
they know” even though they may not understand how they know or be able to articulate what they
know. This ability enables them to interact judiciously with others and the environment in which they
exist. Further, interiorization of perceptions builds knowledge frameworks and creates lenses through
which subjects view the world.
Interestingly, then, while Polanyi’s subjects have greater insight into the world, they do not
necessarily have more agency. This is because agency depends in part on the frameworks subjects
create for themselves. In other words, how much agency subjects actually have depends, partly, on how
much agency they perceive themselves to have. Thus, subjects may actually be free-er or less free than
they think they are, but subjects themselves, because they interpret their perceptions, have some control
over how they act or react to the world. Although, one could argue, too, that if subjects are unaware of
how their perceptions are working, or how they are interpreting their perceptions, they may have less
control over the frameworks they create or the lenses that they build. Thus, their actions may be
determined more by their bodies rather than by any kind of free will. In either case, for Polanyi, then,
subjects create their realities through their perceptions and through their interpretations of those
perceptions.
Although Polanyi emphasizes the human body’s role in creating realities, he does not address the
ways in which silence may benefit subjects or other ways in which silence constructs reality. Polanyi
also does not discuss how social and cultural practices shape subjectivities or realities. Sandra Braman’s
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“When Nightingales Break the Law: Silence and the Construction of Reality,” attempts to do this.
Resonating, somewhat with Picard, Braman argues that digital technologies produce “information
overload” (282) and alter how we experience reality, and as a result subjects need (and in fact seek out
opportunities to experience) silence. This may be because silence is “generative” (283). It kindles new
knowledge and insight, it creates meaning, and allows for contemplative thought. It may also be
“important to productivity, empowerment, and communicative expressiveness” (283). While Picard
shows the numerous ways silence imbricates itself ontologically in subjects’ lives, however, Braman
focuses on the ways in which silence helps shape what subjects know. In addition, unlike Picard,
Braman’s purpose is to show how subjects construct reality through both social construction and what
she calls “contemplative construction.” Braman asserts, however, that while the social construction of
reality is important, focusing only on social construction as a method of reality construction is dangerous
because it has “destructive social and environmental consequences that arise because the operational
sense of reality in decision-making and implementation is skewed” (284). Focusing only on social
interactions also fails to consider what happens within individuals and the larger environment around
them. As a result, Braman advocates for the contemplative construction of reality, which she defines as
“that which takes place through the silent contemplative practices by individuals, irrespective of the
tradition or activities or context within which that contemplation takes place” (285). The contemplative
construction of reality provides subjects alternate methods of knowing (284), helps them create a more
accurate depiction of reality, and helps them make better decisions, Braman says.
For this reason, Braman’s article describes how four areas important in reality construction
processes assist in the social construction of reality and in the contemplative construction of reality, but
in different ways. Both the social construction of reality and the contemplative construction of reality
begin with the subject. While the social construction of reality requires subjects to create identities that
differ from others to contribute to a shared notion of reality, the contemplative construction of reality
focuses on subjects as biological organisms whose silence and contemplation may help form and shape
their identities. Braman contends, for example, that according to linguistic historian George Steiner,
silent reading and contemplation “was central to the emergence of the individual sense of self as it
40

developed during modernity” (286). She says, too, that some subjects feel so anxious about their
identities that they cannot speak.
Braman also maintains that both social construction and contemplative construction of reality
require subjects to communicate what they know. While the social construction of reality focuses on
subjects verbally communicating with each other to create a shared notion of reality, the contemplative
construction of reality focuses on silence as a means of communicating and making sense of the world.
Silences construct reality by shaping meaning or perceptions, Braman says, as when newscasters use
silence to help viewers “recognize and recall important stories just preceding the silence” (286) or when
advertisers use silence to create certain moods or direct viewers’ attention. As a structure for shaping
meaning, Braman argues, silence may be particularly effective because subjects may physiologically and
cognitively need silence to remember or recognize information, because silence can serve as a “semiotic
sign” (287) that indicates shifts in topics, because silence can be used rhetorically, and because silence
can assist in producing revelations.
In addition, both the social construction of reality and the contemplative construction of reality
are grounded in fact. While the social construction of reality relies on socially constructed facts to
produce accepted truths, the contemplative construction of reality is also founded in fact, but may reach
beyond accepted facts or knowledge because it has not yet been fully studied. According to Braman,
research suggests silence is necessary for “knowledge production, a subset of reality construction”
(287). She says historians agree that the increase in knowledge and knowledge production after the
invention of the printing press resulted from silent and contemplative reading practices. She also argues
that “Sociologists of knowledge recognize that reflection is key to knowledge development because only
through reflective silence can one distinguish ‘chunks’ of knowledge relative to a background of
information and distinguish peripheral knowledge from that upon which one is focusing” (287).
According to Braman, the inability to make meaning in an environment shaped by “information
overload” (287) may in fact result from the “lack of silence” (287) in our lives. She says, “Without
silence it may be difficult or impossible to shape or identify the structure that yields meaning, or to
consolidate knowledge out of information and speech” (287). In addition, she says that silences in the
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form of communicative “disruptions” (287) may also generate new knowledge because they identify
areas needing more study.
Finally, Braman says that both the social construction of reality and the contemplative
construction of reality require an interplay between the individual and society.

While social

construction occurs between subjects and society, the contemplative construction of reality occurs both
between “the individual and the self” and “the individual and the universe” (288). Silence, she
maintains, is important to both methods of constructing reality. She suggests that tacit knowledge,
acquired in silence, primarily assists in both the contemplative construction of reality and the social
construction of reality because while tacit knowledge “develops through the reflection, daily practice,
and experience of individuals” (288), it must also be codified and communicated with others. Thus, as
subjects attempt to codify and communicate tacit knowledge, they help shape social constructions of
reality.
Although Braman acknowledges the multiple forces that shape subjectivities – particularly
digital technologies that create feelings of information overload and that construct hyperreal realities –
she indicates that subjects do have some power in shaping who they are and in making sense of the
world around them. Like Polanyi, as well as both Dauenhauer and Picard, Braman proposes that it is
silence, and the biological and knowledge processes that occur in silence, which give subjects this
agency and which ground more accurate notions of reality.
Like Braman and Polanyi, George Kalamaras’s Reclaiming the Tacit Dimension: Symbolic
Form in the Rhetoric of Silence also advocates the importance of silence as a mode of knowing;
however, Kalamaras argues for “a more expansive perception of reality” (8) by broadening the cultural
framework through which we view silence. Kalamaras’s text, which draws its theory from Eastern
mystical philosophy –particularly from the “yogic tradition of Hinduism” (11) -- asserts that our
understanding of silence in the West has been heavily shaped by a history of conceptual, categorical
thinking that has roots in Classical Rhetoric and that has been further impeded by objectivist, feminist,
and postmodern philosophies, which have positioned silence as opposed to language and have also
privileged speech as a means of knowing and gaining power.
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Conceptual thinking, defined by

Kalamaras as “those perceptions formed through process of thought” (8) has resulted in dualistic,
conflictive ways of thinking such as seeing silence opposed to speech. It has also resulted in our
mistrust of silence and our negative conceptualization of it. Instead, Kalamaras says, that by adapting
our cultural framework of silence to include the Eastern mystical framework of paradox -- a central
characteristic of silence --we can cultivate nonconceptual thought, i.e. “those perceptions that are not
bound by the categorizing capacity of intellect or thought” (8), and can achieve “a more reciprocal
understanding of the construction of knowledge derived from the practice of silence” (9).
According to Kalamaras, two ideas in Eastern mystical philosophies are central to reconceptualizing silence as generative, simultaneous, and reciprocal: the belief that paradox lies at the
“core of all experience” (10) and the belief that “the material world as we know it is illusory” (10).
First, Kalamaras says that Eastern mystics view paradox as at the center of all experience. Yet, rather
than viewing paradox as conflictive, they view it as reciprocal. They therefore understand silence as an
“empty-fullness,” (10) and “experience a reciprocity between inner and outer realms” (10) rather than as
opposing and conflicting entities. Second, Kalamaras suggests Eastern mystics believe that because the
material world is illusory, attempts to identify with it will result in “endless duality and unfulfilled
desire” (18). Meditative silence helps suppress this kind of conceptual awareness that arises from the
paradoxical world because it allows the meditator to “withdraw one’s outer awareness of the senses and
[achieve] a heightened state of interiority or suprasensory awareness” (18). The goal, according to
Kalamaras, is not to achieve transcendence but to achieve nonconceptual awareness or “undifferentiated,
nondualistic consciousness” (18).
Kalamaras gives the example of the yin and yang symbol, which illustrates this idea of
reciprocity, simultaneity, and nondualistic thinking. He suggests for example that the yin and yang
symbol depicts not rigid, stable categories of black versus white, but black and white engaged together
in a constant swirling motion with a little bit of the other inside each. He says, “Thus, this image not
only indicates the reciprocity between these two tendencies of dark and light, but through the image of
the swirl, depicts the concept of endless transaction, or the process of change, within the interaction of
these seemingly contradictory forces” (20). Meditative silence is important in generating knowledge
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because “Meditative awareness goes so deeply into consciousness that it realizes there is nothing outside
of itself; there is neither inside nor outside because there are no more ‘sides.’ Liberation or Selfrealization is not a transcendent act of getting outside of perceptual filters, but rather of being in
harmony with the endless transaction of symbolic form” (25).
Engaging in meditative silence results in nonconceptual awareness and allows one to arrive at a
“heightened perception of interiority” (83) and “a rational understanding that includes intuitive modes of
knowing in the making of meaning” (59).

To illustrate the kind of knowledge meditative silence

generates, Kalamaras provides an example from poetry.

According to Kalamaras, Western poets

frequently have attempted to evoke nonconceptual awareness through their use of paradox, syntax, and
metaphor. He suggests, for instance, that we often arrive at nonconceptual thought when we read
poetry. He provides this example from Shakespeare’s sonnet “When forty winters shall besiege thy
brow”:
This were to be new made when thou art old,
And see thy blood warm when thou feel’st it cold (5;13-14).
In this example, Kalamaras asserts that paradox creates a simultaneity of emotions – love and
anger, comfort and unease etc. The words new/old and warm/cold cause the mind to lose focus on
categories and to instead account for the paradox. Readers look for connections between ‘warm’ and
‘new’ or ‘cold’ and ‘old’.

Kalamaras suggests, “The process of accounting for such paradoxes,

therefore, and of constructing meaning may suspend for a moment the reader’s conceptual capacities as
he attempts to apprehend a variety of what Stevens has called ‘resemblances’” (106) As the mind does
so, “the reader experiences a moment of simultaneity, and within it, grasps an intuitive understanding of
complex relationships . . . that the conceptual mind renders distinct” (117).

Kalamaras says the

awareness that arises through silence “is similar to intuitive understandings expressed through art” (121)
because it creates generative conditions that enable us to arrive at new modes of knowing.
Ultimately, Kalamaras also sees silence as “an act of interpretation and, consequently, a
symbolic form” (187). Since humans use symbols to shape their interpretations of perceptions and
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experiences, and silence is one kind of symbolic form, there is no reason to believe that speech alone
shapes one’s reality. Instead he suggests,
Not only the practice of silence is symbolic but the awareness it yields is also a symbol
through which one interprets experience and manifests it as simultaneous, reciprocal, and
interconnected. That is, the simultaneity and reciprocity of nonconceptual understanding
is itself a symbolic form through which one interprets experience as continuously
simultaneous and reciprocal. (190)
Kalamaras’s subject exists in a world of paradoxes that simultaneously generate and construct
each other. The subject’s world cannot be relied upon because it is illusory, and further, subjects cannot
rely upon their senses because the senses merely perceive opposition and increase dualistic thinking.
Meditative silence allows the mind to achieve nondualistic thinking to arrive at deeper levels of knowing
that cannot be expressed or understood in terms of categorical thinking. Subjects arrive at a heightened
sense of awareness (and a heightened understanding of that awareness) that neither Polanyi’s subjects
nor Braman’s achieve. However, the heightened knowledge acquired by Kalamaras’s subjects is not
easily achieved. It requires deeper contemplation than is required by Braman’s subjects and is acquired
through meditative practice requiring guidance. In addition, Kalamaras’s subjects do seem fragmented
from the world and from each other because their reality cannot be known -- it is an illusion; however,
subjects can get a “truer” understanding of the world through their individual consciousness and by
sorting through complex relationships and paradoxes to arrive at deeper levels of knowing. In this way,
they mediate their existence in the world and their relations with others.
Unlike Kalamaras, Krista Ratcliffe’s Rhetorical Listening: Identification, Gender, and Whiteness
further posits another way silence is epistemic, although she does not use that term. Ratcliffe suggests,
for instance, that rhetorical listening functions as a means through which individuals cannot just engage
in cross-cultural understanding with others of different races and genders, but can also intervene in their
own understanding of the discourses surrounding them – thus helping them to better understand their
own identifications, disidentifications, and non-identifications with those discourses. Ratcliffe defines
rhetorical listening as “a trope for interpretive invention, that is, as a stance of openness that a person
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may choose to assume in relation to any person, text or culture; its purpose is to cultivate conscious
identifications in ways that promote productive communication, especially but not solely crossculturally” (25).
For Ratcliffe, rhetorical listening provides a code for conducting ourselves in the world. She
suggests, “Such listening does not presume a naïve, relativistic empathy, such as ‘I’m o.k., you’re o.k.,’
but rather an ethical responsibility to argue for what we deem fair and just while questioning that which
we deem fair and just” (25). Rhetorical listening challenges the “divided logos of Western civilization”
(26), in which individuals assume there is a winner and loser – a right and a wrong view. Instead, it
enables individuals to “[construct] a space wherein listeners may employ their agency (which Stanford
drama theorist Alice Rayner defines as both ‘capacity’ and ‘willingness’) to foster conscious
identifications that may, in turn, facilitate communication” (26). Rhetorical listening involves
1. Promoting an understanding of self and other
2. Proceeding within an accountability logic
3. Locating identifications across commonalities and differences
4. Analyzing claims as well as cultural logics within which these claims function. (26)
Rhetorical listening, therefore, assists in critical thinking and helps in productive communication.
For Ratcliffe, promoting an understanding of self and other occurs as one listens for a speaker’s intent as
well as to one’s own intent. She suggests, “Understanding means listening to discourses not for intent
but with intent – with the intent to understand not just the claims but the rhetorical negotiations of
understanding as well” (28). Listeners must “stand under” (28) discourses, acknowledging them, and
listening to them for “(un)conscious presences, absences, unknowns” (29) and then include this
information into “our world views and decision making” (29). Doing so, she argues, broadens one’s
cultural understanding, in part, because it requires us to see the other as an important part of meaning
making.
Rhetorical listening also fosters an accountability logic because we must recognize that we all
exist as “members of the same village” (31) and are responsible to each other. As a result, we must
recognize the (gendered and racial) privileges and nonprivileges members of the community have which
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are not always earned. Rhetorical listening further asks individuals to identify not just commonalities
among themselves but also to listen to and identify the differences rather than “gloss[ing] over or
eras[ing]” (32) them. Rhetorical listening helps people identify claims and cultural logics (i.e. the “belief
system or shared way of reasoning within which a claim may function” (33)) and enables individuals to
see such claims as being part of certain logic systems.
Ratcliffe presents three tactics for rhetorical listening, although she says there are many. One, is
listening metonymically. Often, she says, we listen metaphorically – listening for what cultural groups
have in common, thus erasing differences between groups and individuals within those groups. By
listening metonymically, one “assumes that two objects do not share a common substance but are rather
merely associated” (98). In this way, one may acknowledge the differences between groups and
individuals within groups because one accepts that we are all situated differently, and we exist in the
world differently.
A second tactic is eavesdropping. According to Ratcliffe, eavesdropping includes “choosing to
stand outside . . . in an uncomfortable spot . . . on the border of knowing and not knowing . . . granting
others the inside position . . . listening to learn” (105). Eavesdropping means acknowledging other
discourses exist, that there are “(un)conscious presences, absences, unknowns” (105) in discourses and
one’s goal is to integrate this information into our own world view. One’s goal is to listen to other
discourses and to consciously learn from it as one integrates it into one’s own worldview. Similarly,
Ratcliffe contends we have a responsibility to eavesdrop on our own discourses – to listen to ourselves
as if from a third person’s perspective to understand how that discourse/language may be heard by
others.
Ratcliffe offers a third tactic – pedagogical listening, which requires both teachers and students
to “recognize resistance, analyze it, and when necessary, resist it” (133). Teachers might listen to what
students say while in the classroom to shape discussions or classes while students might listen
rhetorically to discourses surrounding them to understand how language often functions as tropes with
historical and cultural overtones that shape social meanings and realities.
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Rhetorical listening, Ratcliffe insists, may help people invent, interpret, and judge differently; it
may help individuals engage in argument more productively by enabling them to bring differences
together and hearing differences as harmonious or as discordant. Ratcliffe emphasizes, however, that
listening to the differences is most important. In addition, Ratacliffe says, “In such moments of listening
to each other, to our institutions, to our cultures, and to ourselves, we may hear and then see how our
identities are always already grounded in our identifications, disidentifications, and non-identifications
with others” (171).
Ratcliffe, thus, positions subjects a world in which individuals are gendered and raced and in
which they are often not conscious of the ways in which gender and race situates them. They are also
often not conscious of the ways in which their use of language (because of their gendered and raced
positions) affects them. Through rhetorical listening, Ratcliffe argues, individuals can better learn how
discourses position them, and in addition, they can better understand other (particularly underprivileged) positions. Again, however, it should be made clear that listening is a rhetorical act that
occurs in silence – i.e. it is one’s choice to silence oneself and use that silence to learn about and
understand oneself and others.

3.4 SILENCE AS LITERAL/LINGUISTIC
Literal approaches to silence, Clair suggests, are the most common, especially in communication
studies. Clair defines literal approaches as those that “view the phenomenon as the space between the
words. These silences can be awkward or poetic, chilling or rebellious. They function in a variety of
ways (e.g., as the silent treatment, tender concern, forceful condemnation, comfortable intimacy, shared
understanding)” (6). Because these studies focus on the functional aspects of silence in communication,
this section overviews various linguistic studies of silence.
Often, linguistic studies of silence emphasize silence’s communicative functions and meanings.
For example, Richard Johannesen’s “The Functions of Silence: A Plea for Communication Research”
indicates that “a person cannot not communicate. Hence, silence communicates because listeners and
observers will attach meaning to the silence whether the sender wishes so or not” (29). How subjects
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interpret silence, he says, depends on their personality, their previous experiences, and their cultural
upbringing. However, he proposes silence often means
(1) The person lacks sufficient information to talk on the topic. (2) The person feels no
sense of urgency about talking. (3) The person is carefully pondering exactly what to say
next. (4) The silence may simply reflect the person’s normal rate of thinking. (5) The
person is avoiding discussion of a controversial or sensitive issue out of fear. (6) The
silence expresses agreement. (7) The silence expressed disagreement. (8) The person is
doubtful or indecisive. (9) The person is bored. (10) The person is uncertain of someone
else’s meaning. (11) The person is in awe, or raptly attentive, or emotionally overcome.
(12) The person is snooty or impolite. (13) The person’s silence is a means of punishing
others, of annihilating others symbolically by excluding them from verbal
communication. (14) The person’s silence marks a characteristic personality disturbance.
(15) The person feels inarticulate despite a desire to communicate. . . .(16) The person’s
silence reflects concern for not saying anything to hurt another person. (17) The person is
daydreaming or preoccupied with other matters. (18) The person uses silence to enhance
his own isolation, independence, and sense of self-uniqueness. (19) The silence marks
sulking anger. (20) The person’s silence reflects empathetic exchange, the companionship
of shared mood or insight. (30)
Johannesen’s observations are interesting in that they resonate with Polanyi’s theory of tacit
knowing; while Polanyi focuses on the ways in which silence allows subjects to construct knowledge
and reality, Johannesen’s observations suggests that silence may also be important in how others
construct us as well as their own reality as they perceive and attempt to attribute meaning to someone
else’s silence.
While Johannesen focuses primarily on the meanings attributed to silence, Thomas Bruneau’s
“Communicative Silences:

Forms and Functions” focuses on how silence functions, particularly

psycholinguistically, interpersonally, and socio-culturally. For Bruneau, silence is both a “process of
mind” (17) and a concept imposed on the mind, much like speech and time.
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In discussing

psycholinguistic silences, Brueneau differentiates between “fast-time silences,” which he relates to short
hesitations in speech, and “slow-time silences,” which “are those imposed mental silences closely
associated with the semantic (and metaphorical) processes of decoding speech . . . .” (26). He associates
slow time silences with “organizational, categorical, and spatial movement through levels of experience
and levels of memory” (26). Because communication is an uncertain act, Bruneau suggests, both
speakers and listeners need silence to help them reduce the uncertainty. Speakers hesitate at points
where decision making or planning about linguistic or grammatical decisions occurs, during transitions,
when thoughts are complex, when tasks have been successful, for reasons of credibility, or because of
anxiety (24). Listeners, he suggests, pause to create slow time to help them decode and process
messages.
A second function of silence, Bruneau says, is that it therefore may affect our perception of time.
Silence, he says, is often associated with “slow time” (21), or in the mystical traditions, the “cessation of
time” (21). Events that are highly sensory are often remembered or experienced in “slow time.”
Therefore, he says, “One’s perceptual processing appears to be slowed and expanded as one slows or
expands time by imposing silence . . . . each individual’s mind-time (and consequent awareness) during
decoding of experience is a function of the intensity, duration, and frequency of his own imposed
silence” (22).
For Brueneau, interactive silences require participants to be more aware of the “degree and
manner” (28) in which the other participant expects them to participate. During this kind of silence,
Bruneau suggests subjects make many decisions: who should speak and when, what questions should be
asked for clarification of meaning, etc. He says, “Within interactive silences, each member of a dyad or
small group usually makes decisions to speak or remain silent. These decisions also appear to be a
function of the interactive context, as a function of each member’s concept of self, as well as a function
of deciding to reveal or conceal self” (29). Interactive silences, however, serve other functions too:
They allow participants to make “inferences and judgments about the character, motives, and personality
of other participants” (29-30). They allow participants to become emotionally closer, and they can serve
as a “strong form of attack” (30) among friends or family members. These silences can also be used to
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exert control by “commanding decoder attention” (30). They can create ambiguity, letting others
question previous judgments or make inferences about someone. They can prevent relationships from
occurring or help establish “interpersonal and group power” (31) in authoritative-subordinate
relationships. In addition, interactive silences may be used to conceal violent emotions, grief, or
passion, or they may provide a means of coping with new groups or surroundings.
Bruneau also discusses socio-cultural silences, which are “those related to the characteristic
manner in which entire social and cultural orders refrain from speech and manipulate both
psycholinguistic and interactive silences . . . . [and] may define cultural patterns of communication much
better than what is said” (36).

This kind of silence, then, is a response to “a generalized man-made

authority” (37), but may also be used for worship and reverence. Such silences are “controlled by
dogma, communication norms, faith, and sometimes, by actual authority figures or perceived connection
of these figures with highest authority” (37-8). This kind of silence establishes “what can or what
cannot be said; when one should appropriately maintain silent restraint, or the manner in which utterance
appropriately breaks silence” (38-9).
Like Johannesen, Bruneau’s observations emphasize how others may construct us through our
silence.

Bruneau, however, particularly focuses on how others’ perceptions of silence and the

interpretations of those perceptions affect relationships with others in that world. He suggests, for
instance, that as subjects interact, they perceive and interpret each other’s silences. These interpretations
lead subjects not only to alter their interactions with each other based on those interpretations but also to
construct each other and themselves through the interpretation of those silences. As subjects interpret
that silence, they must ask what the other’s silence means, what it suggests about who that person is, and
what might the interpretation of the ‘other’ say about themselves. For both Bruneau and Johannesen,
silence represents another means through which subjects communicate with each other, and establish
relationships –especially relationships of power – with others in the world around them.
Other linguistic studies have emphasized how silence affects subjects’ construction of
themselves and others. Cynthia Crown and Stanley Feldstein’s “Psychological Correlates of Silence and
Sound in Conversational Interaction” found that speakers who perceived themselves to be introverted,
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i.e. who described themselves as “distrustful, easily upset, worrying, shy, suspicious, troubled, fussy,
and driven” (38) tended to pause longer in interpersonal conversations than those who perceived
themselves as extroverts – “easy-going, assertive, talkative, enthusiastic, unsentimental, and group
dependent” (38). Pause length, however, also depended on the characteristics of the listener. Those
listeners described as “precise, skeptical, self-reliant, unsentimental, and practical” (38) elicited pauses
that were longer.

Crown and Feldstein also found that “conversational silences did influence

interpersonal perception” (43) and that “perceivers tend to act in terms of their judgment whether or not
the latter are accurate” (40).
Another study, Anne Graffam Walker’s “The Two Faces of Silence: The Effect of Witness
Hesitancy on Lawyers’ Impressions,” indicates that in witness testimony, pauses indicated areas of
witness vulnerability and evoked “doubt in the hearer” (73). Power relations between lawyers and
witnesses affected how witnesses were perceived and those who violated rules governing conduct placed
themselves at a greater risk of being perceived negatively, “since negative attributions of one feature can
lead to misattributions about others” (73). Pauses were also perceived differently by the speaker and the
hearer, and therefore Walker suggests we must become more aware of “how impressions are formed,
what their origins may be, the effect they may have upon critical judgement, and their susceptibility to
error” (73). Like Johannesen’s and Bruenau’s studies, Walker’s and Crown and Feldstein’s studies
emphasize that our silences assist others in constructing subjectivities for us.

Walker’s text also

highlights a small paradox: While we may perceive our silences and our subjectivities one way, others
may simultaneously interpret our silences an entirely different way, thus creating subjectivities for us
that we are entirely unaware of and may even disagree with.
Another kind of linguistic study – the ethnographic study of silence – focuses on cultural
differences in the ways different societies value and perceive silence. Thomas Bruneau and Satoshi
Ishii’s “Communicative Silences:

East and West” argues that cultural groups “stylize” silence

“according to their traditional wisdom, beliefs, and attitudes” (2). A good example of stylized silence
occurs in Gregory Nwoye’s “Eleoquent Silence Among the Igbo of Nigeria.” Nwoye suggests that
because the Igbo are an extroverted group of people, silence is highly ritualized. During premature
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deaths, for example, mourners wait four days before approaching the deceased’s home. When they do
arrive, they greet the family in silence, sit in silence, and take their leave in silence. Nwoye explains
that “it is assumed that since everyone knows what has happened, it would be superfluous to talk about
it, and such discussion would intensify the grief of the bereaved, which no genuine sympathizer intends”
(186). During sacrifices, too, pilgrims must walk in silence, greeting no one. Doing so shows that the
pilgrim is “engaged in a serious spiritual task and should not be disturbed by such mundane things as the
exchange of greetings” (187).
Nwoye also says that silence in Igbo culture is used for punishment and control as well as a form
of public acceptance. He maintains that silence is an “effective means of social control” (188), as
members who go astray are ostracized. By law, men, women, and children are forbidden to speak to
offending members or their families and community members do not trade with offending members
until absolution has been given to the offending members. Silence also indicates acceptance during
public marriage proposals. Girls who accept proposals remain silent and run home shyly. Nwoye says,
“If she accepts, she should be too happy to talk; otherwise she should be too sad to say anything.
Moreover, she is not supposed to know the right answers to give in either case because an answer,
particularly if it is appropriate, could indicate she is versed in the ways of the world – an obvious
disqualification for a girl who hopes to be married’ (189). Nwoye’s study is interesting because he
suggests cultural and social perspectives of silence are tacitly used to control social actions and
interactions of a society’s members by influencing acceptable (and unacceptable) social roles.

3.5 SILENCE AS IDEOLOGICAL
According to Clair, ideological silence refers to the cultural and political practices within a
society that enable institutions to “legitimize their existence by silencing women, children, and
minorities” (31). These practices are silent, i.e. unspoken forms of control that maintain hegemonic
practices within a society. The dominant group maintains its power and control in part through
discursive practices that silence the “interests, issues, and identities” (187) of those associated with the
minority groups. Clair suggests that silencing occurs on multiple levels. It can occur on the individual
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and group level, with marginalized members sometimes assisting in their own oppression or the
oppression of others.

Silencing also occurs on an institutional level through legal, religious, or

educational organizations. Micro-level practices and macro-level practices support and sustain each
other.
Minority group members participate in their own silencing in various ways. At the individual
and group level, silencing results from “within group privileging, between group privileging, and the
privileging of practices or structures” (57). Within group privileging, Clair contends, occurs when
members within a marginalized group deem some members more or less worthy than others. In the case
of sexual harassment, for example (the primary focus of Clair’s text), women as a group may feel
outraged when a nun is sexually harassed but not when a prostitute is. Prostitutes who are sexually
harassed and complain about being harassed are silenced by other women who deem them less worthy
of being taken seriously. Thus, the harassment of some women becomes reinforced or accepted by other
women.
Between group privileging occurs when marginalized group members behave differently to
members of the dominant group based on the status of the offending dominant group member. Clair
suggests women flight attendants, for example, felt more negatively toward harassment when it was
initiated by “a lower-status male employee” (59) rather than “an equal or higher-status male employee”
(59). Thus, the status of an offending dominant group member may affect the degree to which a
marginalized member allows herself to be silenced. This partial acceptance of harassment creates a
double standard which undermines resistance and contributes to the silencing of marginalized members.
Privileging practices of oppression occur when “practices or acts that link the two groups and
sustain the domination of one group over another function as a part of the hegemonic process” (60).
Women, for example, may feel less inclined to take seriously “sexual innuendoes, degrading remarks,
and sexually oriented disrespectful behaviors” (60). They therefore privilege some kinds of oppression
over others, and in doing so, create an environment where certain kinds of harassment appear
acceptable.
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Ideological silences are created and maintained in numerous ways, but Clair focuses primarily on
“the dynamic relationship surrounding language and silence” (37), “micro/macro-level dialectic” (37),
and “the tensions between oppression and resistance” (37). Clair first focuses on the relationship of
language and silence, arguing that some language silences and some silence communicates. Clair
asserts that certain kinds of discourse silence by “distort[ing] power relations, disguise[ing] inequity,
sequester[ing] resistant discourses, and ultimately clos[ing] emancipatory forms of communication”
(38). This discourse is “framed” (79) in different ways to purposefully silence.
One discursive frame, “accepting the dominant interests as universal,” occurs when institutions
or group members place the needs of the organization over personal interests. A minority group
member then may conclude: “I’ll just quit my job instead of filing sexual harassment charges because
that will be easier for everyone” (81). This type of discursive frame may be used by institutions to
silence minorities or by a minority herself, who complies in her own silencing. Another frame, the
“simple misunderstanding,” occurs when organizations or group members attempt to “disguise
contradictions inherent to the system” (81) by suggesting that misunderstandings have occurred. An
example, Clair suggests, is when a worker says, “I’m not sure if it was sexual harassment or if the man
was just flirting with me” (81). A third discursive frame, “reification” (also called “naturalization” (38))
prevents communication “by framing oppressive events as natural to the point of reification” (38)
Sayings such as “boys will be boys” (39), often used to justify sexual harassment, indicates that men are
biologically structured to behave in certain ways, and as a result, have no power to change their
behavior. Thus, those who are sexually harassed are silenced into accepting the harassment because
they perceive that it cannot be changed.
Discursive practices at institutional levels, Clair says, also contribute to maintaining hegemonic
practices, particularly the practices of bureaucratization, which among other things create “subordination
and individuals given to passive, timorous, and subservient behavior” (104); commodification, which
requires the exchange of services for work; and privatization, which involves treating women’s work
and services as a “private service” (105). Clair lists three kinds of institutional-level discourses: takenfor-granted discourse, strategic ambiguity, and exclusionary discourse.
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Taken-for-granted discourse reinforces hegemonic practices by indicating that what has occurred
belongs to the natural order of things. Clair gives the example of a hierarchy in a business. She says we
have come to believe it is natural that “the more important the decision, the higher up on the hierarchical
chain of command one must go to reach an authoritative or valid decision” (107). However, as Clair
points out, other structures are just as “natural.”

Clair presents Eisenberg’s notion of strategic

ambiguity as one example. She says that “strategic ambiguity is the use of discourse to foster multiple
interpretations and promote unified diversity from organizational groups” (107). Strategic ambiguity
allows individuals and groups to reach consensus by enabling individuals or groups to interpret policies
or procedures “based on their own viewpoint” (107). These interpretations can be achieved through
“vague language, equivocal information, puns, and false deictics” (107).

Groups favoring the

organization will always interpret the organization’s policies or procedures in a favorable way.
Exclusionary discourse, attempts to minimize or trivialize an issue or a concern or it may address the
concern but do so in a way that excludes important information.
Clair also maintains that resistance and oppression often “create, perpetuate, and sustain current
organizational order” (127). Minority groups that have some power, for example, may oppress a
member of a dominant group in their similar circumstance or status to prevent that member from
achieving a higher status – in other words, they oppress that group member as a means of resisting
him/her as well as the dominant practices. In doing so, however, Clair argues they reinforce the
hegemonic practices and perpetuate the social roles created for themselves under the hegemonic order.
However, just as discourse may silence, thus reinforcing hegemonic practices, Clair says silence
is also a powerful form of resistance. Clair asserts that according to Michel de Certeau, subjects are not
“passive users or consumers of dominant ideologies” (166). Instead, subjects tacitly enact creative ways
in everyday life to subvert those ideologies. According to de Certeau, subjects may resist, in part, by
using tactics like “la perruque” and “bricolage” – both silent resistive practices. According to de
Certeau, la perruque occurs when workers use company time for their own purposes or company tools
to create products for their own use. Bricolage occurs when subjects “[make] a form of resistance out of
what [they] have” (167). For example, a secretary given a letter to type may leave the typographical
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errors in rather than editing them out. Ideological silences, then, also create and maintain subjectivities
primarily by establishing relations of power. Subjects associated with dominant groups enact practices
that subordinate others. Yet, as de Certeau suggests, marginalized groups are not entirely constructed.
They can, through every day practices and actions, resist the subjectivities forced upon them, and they
can re-appropriate how those subjectivities are perceived.
In addition to Clair’s notion of ideological silences, one might also appropriate Bakhtin’s notion
of heteroglossia here; for silences, like language, may also be heteroglossic – full of the ideologies and
intentions of all who have used them. Subjects, thus, must also struggle to make their silences fit their
intentions through monologistic and dialogic tendencies. How one uses silence, whether imposed or
chosen always also depends on the rhetorical contexts in which one exists.

3.6 SILENCE AS RHETORICAL
The rhetorical approach to silence argues that speakers use silence, like language, to achieve
specific, rhetorical goals. In Unspoken, A Rhetoric of Silence, Cheryl Glenn suggests, “. . . silence – the
unspoken -- is a rhetorical art that can be as powerful as the spoken or written word. Like speech, the
meaning of silence depends on a power differential that exists in every rhetorical situation: who can
speak, who must remain silent, who listens, and what those listeners can do” (9). She suggests, too, that
while silence “reveals speech” (3) it simultaneously “enacts its own sometimes complementary rhetoric”
(3), which is just as meaningful.
While the delivery of silence is always the same, how others interpret it depends on the “socialrhetorical context in which it occurs” (9). Every day, Glenn says, “each of us experiences or participates
in silence and silencing to suit our rhetorical purposes: silence as a strategic choice, or silence as an
enforced position” (13). When silence is used as a strategic choice, she suggests it can be used
purposefully and effectively (13): It can both “deploy power” and “defer power” (15). But whether the
silence is interpreted positively or negatively depends, in part, on whether that silence is a choice or
whether it has been imposed by someone else, and Glenn maintains that every act of rhetorical
silence/silencing occurs as a result of power differentials. She says, “the alpha group in every social
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situation determines (and tries to control) the speech, speaking patterns, and silences for the women and
men in the beta, gamma, (and lower) groups in every social situation” (30). Glenn also asserts that
“verbal or silent interactions are exercises and negotiations in power. One person acts (with words or
silence), another reacts (ditto), and either interpersonal balance is achieved or imbalance is created” (301).
In addition, Glenn says silencing can occur from the top down, across discourse communities, or
from the bottom up. Those in power use silence to command or sustain attention, to ignore others or cut
them off, to exert control or manage a situation, or to punish. When used this way silence causes
confusion, anxiety, or frustration in subordinates– especially if they feel slighted. Subordinates, in turn,
may accept their silencing as a form of respect, as an acceptance of the control, as “a willingness to
wait” (32), or as a form of resistance to that authority. When used across a discourse community,
silence might be a form of reprimand, a means to regain one’s social status or a way to keep one’s
distance from others. When used from the bottom up, for example, by students in a classroom, silence
might be seen as a kind of respect for or as resistance to authority. Stylized silences such as those that
students use, Glenn says, “can function as a face-saving device, a way to maintain one’s dignity and
individual authority in the face of authority and power. After experiencing any measure of shame,
stylized sulking is a way to (re)align with one’s own peer group and to sustain distance and separation
from the shamer” (41).
How subjects use silence, Glenn says varies. Silence may result from subjects’ inhibitions –
from feeling embarrassed or shy. Or, it may result from a decision not to comply with authority. It may
also serve to protect emotionally or psychologically. Subjects may use silence to discipline, and Glenn
contends that the disciplining effects of being silenced have both physical and psychological effects on
the body. Those who have been silenced often express uncertainty and doubt about their ideas, they
may fear speaking out or tremble when they speak, they may lose self-confidence, or they may lose their
sense of self worth.
To better illustrate how silence functions rhetorically, Glenn analyzes the silence of Anita Hill
during the Clarence Thomas hearings. Initially, Glenn says, Hill chose to be silent about her harassment
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in part because of her subordinate status and in part to protect herself and her professional position as a
tenure-track professor at the University of Oklahoma Law School. This silence, however, was not a
passive act. Hill chose to remain publicly silent about the incidents, though she did confide the incidents
to close friends. Glenn sees Hill’s self-imposed silence as a rhetorical choice that initially positioned
Hill in a place of power and prestige. Glenn says, “Neither the white men on the committee nor the
president of the United States knew what she knew. Neither those men nor Thomas knew what she
might say under oath. And when she held to her position of silence by refusing to testify, she held
power for those same reasons” (55).
However, once Hill was subpoenaed to speak out, and she did so, she relinquished not just her
position of power but also the protection and anonymity that silence provided. Instead, Hill found
herself caught in a “double bind” (55). Because she was relatively unknown and needed to establish her
credibility, she paradoxically had to admit she had experienced harassment that had degraded her. As a
result, Glenn says members of the Senate Judiciary Committee “exerted their sociopolitical power (and
regulatory norms) over the nonvoluntary testimony of the nonwhite woman whom they had subpoenaed
to speak.

As they scapegoated her, they also rendered her a sexualized female presence, barely

bothering to conceal their privilege of race and gender” (55-6). Because she spoke out she was attacked
by both whites and blacks for trying to undermine Thomas’ appointment to the Supreme Court and for
“playing the victim” (57).
In addition, Glenn says, “Gender plays a strong role in terms of who gets to speak out and be
listened to – and who should remain silent. For many, then, Hill should not have betrayed her race for
the benefit of her sex. She should have remained silent, though how she was to do so in the face of a
subpoena has never been made clear” (58).

Only feminists, Glenn says, recognized that gender

differences influenced who could speak out, who must remain silent, who could decide and when.
Glenn suggests, “As Linda Martin Alcoff puts it, ‘Who is speaking to whom turns out to be as important
for meaning and truth as what is said; in fact, what is said turns out to change according to who is
speaking and who is listening’” (58).
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Glenn asserts that for Hill, silence may have been the only rhetorical choice available given the
rhetorical context which included mostly powerful white males, a nonwhite female, and the belief that
“any harassed woman is somehow responsible for the behavior” (59). This rhetorical context created the
double bind: “keep silent, or speak and be shamed” (59). According to Glenn, Hill may have kept her
ten-year silence because she was unsure about what to say, because she wanted to avoid a confrontation,
because she was “ ‘emotionally overcome’” (Johannesen qtd. in Glenn 60), or because she wanted to
speak out but didn’t know what to say. Silence also offered Hill “the possibility of choosing what to do
first or next, enclosing or distancing [herself] from various events or other people, and making [herself]
known or not” (60). Hill’s decision to be silent for so long, however, was interpreted negatively, and her
prestigious position as a professor in a law school contributed to ideological silencing by white and
black men and women. Hill’s speaking out cost her both her reputation as well as her job.
While Glenn’s text illustrates how women in politics have used silence as a rhetorical strategy or
have had silence imposed upon them, Barry Brummett’s “Towards a Theory of Silence as a Political
Strategy” suggests that political power is often derived from and maintained by political strategic
silence, which differs from other forms of silence. Brummett defines “political strategic silence” (289)
as “the refusal of a public figure to communicate verbally when that refusal (1) violates expectations, (2)
draws public attribution of fairly predictable meanings, and (3) seems intentional and directed at an
audience” (289). He argues silence is “strategic” “only when talk is expected” (289) and not provided.
When speech is expected and is met with an unexplained silence, audiences focus primarily on the
silence and begin to attach meaning to it. These meanings may vary. But Brummett says that unlike
other forms of silence, political strategic silence always elicits the same predictable meanings of
“mystery, uncertainty, passivity, or relinquishment” (290) regardless of the context. Politicians, then,
can rely on audiences attaching these meanings to silence. He says,
Meanings attributed to this sort of silence encourage selective perception of the context.
Events and utterances that can confirm the predictable meanings of political strategic
silence will be better remembered as the context for the silence. A context for any event
must be carved out of the universe that surrounds events, and the meanings predictably
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attributed to strategic silence guide that carving. So the contexts of political strategic
silence explain that silence in light of meanings that they picked up from the silence
itself. (291)
Part of the power of strategic silence, Brummett asserts, is that in politics, verbal discourse
provides the means through which a government reassures the public. In fact, he says “much of the
product of politics is reassuring talk. Talk reaffirms the hierarchical principles on which the polis is
established and links government and public” (292). Strategic silence creates mystery and uncertainty
because people no longer have discourse to reassure them or to construct relationships with them.
Strategic silence, therefore, “encourages the attribution of mystery and uncertainty in the body politic”
(292). Mystery and uncertainty, he suggests, need not be looked upon negatively, however. That
mystery and uncertainty may motivate people to overcome apathy. It may also create a kind of distance
from a political leader, which appeals to and attracts followers.
Just as discourse creates reassurance, Brummett also says that in politics, discourse creates
political personalities. He says, “The characters the public sees through the mass media are constructed
images rather than ‘real people.’ Those images are created largely through discourse” (293). Speaking
is equated with action, and he suggests, “Talk is a largely irreplaceable means of defining situations,
exigencies, and the way the world is” (293). Therefore, he says that when leaders are silent, they project
a personae that is perceived to be passive:
The persona may be acting, but if the persona is not communicating an interpretation of
those actions to the public, then the persona is rhetorically passive. A silent, passive
persona has relinquished control over defining and shaping the world. Even if a silent
persona is actually doing a great deal, definition of those actions has been relinquished to
the speculation of press and public, speculation that will find mystery, passivity etc. in
those actions. Silence allows unchecked inference about one’s motive and actions (293294).
The rhetorical situation determines whether the public views passivity in a leader at a particular
moment in time as positive or negative. To illustrate how strategic silence has been employed and how
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it can also construct subjectivity, Brummett analyzes the events surrounding President Carter’s address
to the nation on July 5, 1979. Brummett suggests that prior to the scheduled address, Carter had come
back from a summit meeting in Tokyo at which leaders of major nations discussed “the rising cost and
decreasing availability of crude oil” (297). The nation expected Carter to discuss new policies in his
address to the nation; however, abruptly, Carter cancelled the address to the nation. Officials said that
Carter was unhappy with the draft of his speech, but Carter gave no explanations. Brummett says, “The
cancellation was so unusual that the President’s failure to speak captured public attention in a way that
few utterances could have” (297). After ten days of meeting with various public officials, Carter
addressed the nation on television, and two-thirds of the nation tuned in to hear him. Brummett asserts
that Carter’s silence was strategic because it was “extended and deliberate” (297), it “drew the
attribution of predictable meanings,” and it was “intentional and strategic” (297). However, Brummett
argues that in Carter’s case, the public perceived Carter’s silence negatively, and this contributed to the
public perceiving him as passive.
Brummett says that because Carter was perceived prior to the incident as indecisive, especially
during the 1976 campaign, his silence seemed to affirm his indecision because it appeared mysterious
and the reason given for his silence–Carter disliked his original draft--seemed uncertain. This feeling of
mystery and uncertainty intensified and contributed to broad speculations about that silence. The feeling
of mystery and uncertainty, then, affected the public’s perception of Carter as a passive leader who
lacked the ability to act and lead. Ultimately, this perception negatively affected Carter because as
Brummett says, “He had relinquished the symbolic ability to define what he was doing.

That

relinquishment allowed columnists such as William Safire to define the context, and the definitions were
usually consistent with a passive and inactive persona” (301).
Both Brummett and Glenn, then, view silence as a tool subjects wield for specific rhetorical
purposes, but especially to establish and maintain power relationships. How subjects use silence tacitly
defines social roles and subjectivites; in addition, both Glenn and Brummett suggest that how much
power and agency silence yields for subjects depends on the rhetorical context in which subjects find
themselves. Like Clair, they suggest that those in power primarily control the rhetorical situation and
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determine what can be said, when, and by whom. However, as Brummett’s article indicates, for
rhetorical silence to be effective, subjects (even those in the dominant group) must be cognizant of their
timing and use of silence. They must also be aware of how they have been perceived in the past as well
as how others have perceived their silence in the past because this will also influence how others
perceive them and it will determine the kinds of subjectivities that others construct for them.

3.7 SILENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY
Based on the above research, it is evident that silence functions in many of the same ways
language does -- ideologically, ontologically, epistemologically, and literally. Postmodern thinkers have
based their theories of subjectivity on language precisely because language functions to shape subjects
in ideological, ontological, and epistemological ways. However, because silence functions in similar
ways, and indeed works with language to create meaning as well as subjectivities, theories of
subjectivity must include both language and silence. Chapter four examines how one might include
silence in a theory of subjectivity based on language.
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Chapter 4: Integrating Silence into a Theory of Subjectivity
4.1 INTRODUCTION
If silence, like language, is a rhetorical act, then it must not only communicate, but it must also
be ideological, epistemological, and ontological. Performances of silence (whether imposed or chosen)
are always ideological. They are grounded in individual, social, and cultural belief systems about
silence (i.e. who may speak, who must be silent, what listeners may do) and at the same time, they are,
like discursive acts, always imbricated in power relations. Our performances of silence are affected by
multiple ideological factors: how we understand silence culturally and socially (as positive or negative,
for instance, and our ideas about who must be silent); how we feel about our own silences (Are they
imposed or chosen? Are they liberating or restraining?); how we perceive others’ silences (Are they
communicating anger? Joy? Confusion?); and how we feel about others with whom we engage in
silence, and the power-structure inherent in that relationship. Performances of silence are also always
grounded in ideologies about what is or is not an acceptable performance of speaking or silence.
As a rhetorical act, silence is also epistemic. As Glenn and other scholars have shown in the
previous chapter, silence may enact its own rhetoric and its own meaning, or it may work with language
to do so; either way, however, silence generates and communicates meaning, and thus creates
knowledge about oneself or others. How silence shapes meaning-making depends on the context in
which it occurs, the form it takes, how individuals perceive and interpret it, and how they enact/perform
that silence for themselves and for others. Ideologies of silence and silencing, certainly, tacitly generate
knowledge about who we are or who we want to be. However, performances of silence through
meditative acts, as Kalamaras suggests, may enable us to transcend dualistic thinking and understand our
realities differently, or it could alternatively serve to more deeply entrench or make explicit ideologies
already present. As Ratcliffe argues, also, our purposeful silence in rhetorical listening may assist us in
creating knowledge about ourselves, others, or the world in which we exist as we listen to the discourses
of others, and use these to critically question our own ideologies and beliefs. Ratcliffe’s argument, too,
is important because it positions both speaker and listener in important subject positions – each
performing an important rhetorical act.
64

Finally, silence is also ontological because it shapes part of who we are. Humans do not simply
exist in spaces of discourse or silence.

As Dauenhauer suggests, language and silence exist

simultaneously in the world and within subjects. The constant interplay of language and silence is
always unstable, enabling multiple subjectivities and the interpretation of multiple subjectivities. We
are shaped by speech as well as by silence; however, incorporating silence into a theory of subjectivity
can be problematic. Silence works in multiple ways with language to form our subjectivities, and these
are always dependent upon the rhetorical context. In addition, as has been discussed already, in
rhetorical situations, silence can be ideological, epistemological, ontological, and communicative
simultaneously, making one’s theorizing of it difficult.
Despite these difficulties, this chapter attempts to incorporate theories of silence into Foster’s
theory of subjectivity. This chapter does not differentiate between ideological, epistemological, and
ontological silences. Instead, it includes these different kinds of silences in Foster’s already created
categories

of

“Space/Time/History”

(81),

“Language

and

Discourse”

(82),

“Self”

(89),

Alterity/Other/Horizon” (99), and “Addressivity/Answerability” (104).

4.2

SPACE/TIME/HISTORY
As one may recall from Chapter 2, Foster grounds subjects in space, time, and history. She

suggests that while subjects socially construct notions of time, no two subjects can exist simultaneously
in the exact same space. As a result, subjects’ experiences in the world, and their perceptions of
themselves and others are unique. These differences create spaces where meaning-making can occur.
She suggests meaning-making results through the rhetorical networks in which subjects exist, and these
rhetorical networks help subjects understand their “relationships to . . . [themselves] and to the world”
(85). The rhetorical networks Foster discusses, however, are linguistic – i.e. it is primarily through
language that subjects create meaning. Foster’s networks, therefore, overlook an important aspect of
subjectivity and of networks themselves. One might include silence in this theory of subjectivity, first,
by broadening the notion of the rhetorical network. Subjects do exist in space, but that space is
characterized by language and silence, and subjects must grapple with both to make meaning. The
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rhetorical networks in which subjects exist, then, must include both language and silence, for it is their
performance of both with others that enable them to understand their relationship to themselves and to
the world in which they exist, to make meaning and to create knowledge.

4.3

LANGUAGE/DISCOURSE/SILENCE
If rhetorical networks include both language and silence, then both must be theorized, not

as separate rhetorical acts with one privileged over another but as acts that work together – that produce
and stimulate the other to create meaning. Foster’s theory of networked subjectivity, based on some of
Bakhtin’s theoretical concepts, is useful, because it provides spaces to discuss the many ways silence and
discourse imbricate themselves with each other to create meaning. Foster suggests, for instance, that for
Bakhtin, language is characterized by degrees of sameness and difference – monologism and dialogism-which exist in constant tension with each other. Monologism “functions as a centripetal force within
discourse and . . . represents the discourse of religion, the state, or the parent” (Foster 85). Foster, citing
Todorov, says, “Monologue, then, ignores the other, pretending to be ‘the last word,’ which is why ‘to
some extent it objectivizes all reality’” (Foster 85; Todorov 107). Dialogism enables words to have the
multiple meanings of those who use them. She also suggests language, itself, is characterized by
heteroglossia -- “‘each word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged
life’” and “’contextual overtones . . . are inevitable in the word’” (85). Heteroglossia, then, mediates
“between opposing forces in language” (88) and serves to continually “reconceptualize the word” (88).
As has been discussed, silence may be heteroglossic, and subjects must struggle with it to suit
their intentions. Silence, however, also works with and as part of both monologistic and dialogistic
tendencies to create meaning. Monologism, for instance, creates ideological silences that not only
attempt to physically silence but silence through marginalizing subjects, hierarchizing them, and
imposing subjectivities. Typical theories of subjectivity grounded in language might stop here arguing
that language constructs subjects entirely. However, while monologism does silence, that silence is
never neutral – it is filled with the expectations and intentions of the silencer and silenced, which work
with or against each other to create meaning. Silences are always ideologically constructed; however,
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they are also interpreted and enacted in ideological ways. Such silences, therefore, are unstable because
subjects always “speak back” through their silence. How they “speak back” through silence depends on
how they perceive their silence/ing and how they choose to act/react to it. For instance, rather than
creating an “absence” in the rhetorical network, such silence/ing more often creates an awareness of a
dual subjectivity (what W.E.B. DuBois might refer to as a “veil” for example – an awareness of a mefor-myself and a me-for-others mentality) in a rhetorical relationship. This awareness enables multiple
rhetorical moves that may occur tacitly to resist the imposed silence and subjectivity, to accept it, or to
create other kinds of silences and subjectivities for oneself.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, DeCerteau maintains subjects often silently subvert dominant
discourses and ideologies in creative, everyday ways, using tactics such as briccologe or la perruque.
However, one might, similarly, choose to react to that silencing by using silence in return – to punish or
exclude, to listen rhetorically, to give the appearance of acceptance. One might also choose to react to
that silence/silencing by using meditation or fine art to transcend, at least momentarily, the
subjectivity/silence imposed. In addition, Ralph Cintron’s Angel’s Town: Chero Ways, Gang Life, and
Rhetorics of the Everyday suggests subjects tacitly find ways to create real or invented alternate
subjectivities when political/institutional structures attempt to silence them (with monologistic
discourse). Those subjectivities may, for instance, include additional identities they create illegally for
themselves through documents such as birth certificates, passports, etc. They may be created through
fantasy – with posters of what one wishes one could be – attached to a wall, or they may be created by
one’s participation in other communities/activities through which one has more status and power. While
subjects may be silenced momentarily in certain context through monologistic discourses, that silencing
is never absolute because subjects may appropriate that silence to their own purposes and “speak back”
to those attempting to silence them.
Thus, Foster is correct in suggesting that monologism pretends “to be ‘the last word’” (85),
because even though monologism silences, it never can be the last word. Subjects may always use
silence rhetorically to “speak back.” One might suggest, too, that monologism arises out of certain kinds
of silence, which enable it and work with it to sustain it. Monologism and its silences, then, depend on
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the rhetorical situation, which enables it: the speaker and the listener, who those speakers and listeners
are, and what they can do.
The notion of heteroglossia is similarly imbricated in notions of silence because the “contexts” in
which words exist and become “flavored” include many kinds of silence, which function in differing
ways to shape a word’s interpretation and thus its meaning. A word’s context, for instance, is created not
just by the word itself or its rhetorical context, but it is also shaped by the kind of discourse it is being
used in and the accompanying silences that work with that discourse. In addition, that context is created
through the kind of silence accompanying the utterance itself, as Dauenhauer suggests. Although
Dauenhauer’s theory of silence is problematic in part because he essentializes silence by attempting to
name and categorize its specific forms and functions, his work is useful precisely for this reason. In
attempting to categorize its forms and functions, Dauenhauer illustrates that silence takes numerous
forms that function differently with language to create meaning. The context in which a word occurs,
then, is “flavored” in part by the silence that accompanies it and by how subjects use and interpret that
silence.
For instance, as was discussed in Chapter 3, Dauenhauer differentiates between intervening
silences and deep silences. He defines intervening silence as “that occurrence or sequence of
occurrences of silence which punctuate both the words and phrases of a spoken sentence and the string
of sentences which fit together” (6). These kinds of silences perform both methodical and rhythmical
functions and are important in creating meaning.

Dauenhauer asserts, “The appropriate number,

placement, and duration of intervening silences are just as important to the dramatic, if not to the lexical
sense of a story as the appropriate proportioned length, internal balance, etc. of the sound phrase” (7),
i.e. the utterance. How one (consciously or unconsciously) uses intervening silences, then, will affect
the flavoring of a word and how it means. Dauenhauer suggests this is especially apparent when one
tells a joke. How one uses intervening silences in articulating the joke will affect how it is remembered.
In addition, Dauenhauer says the patterned use of intervening silences and utterances mark an utterance
as being “’peculiarly mine,’ ‘anyone’s,’ ‘yours and mine’” (8), which further flavors the word’s context
because it associates the word more specifically with a particular person. Dauenhauer also identifies
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“deep silences” (16) as important and at work “in all utterances of whatever sort” (16). Although deep
silences come in many different modes, Dauenhauer discusses, for instance, the silence of intimates.
Such silences are not “subordinate to utterance” (16). Instead, utterances that occur in deep silence are
“oriented to and [find their] place in silence” (17). Utterances of intimates arise out of their deep
silences and are flavored by those silences – whether those deep silences are indicative of love, hate, or
resignation. This silence, then, is part of the context in which a word “lives its life.”
Words’ contexts, however, also depend on the kinds of discourse they belong to and the silences
that accompany those discourses. As was discussed in Chapter 3, Dauenhauer suggests that different
kinds of discourses have different kinds of conditions, purposes, audiences etc. and as a result discourses
use silences differently (and silence differently) to create meaning. The silences/ing involved in
scientific discourses, for instance, differs from the kinds of silence/ing involved in artistic discourses
(see Chapter 3). Jaworski also suggests, “Different degrees of the presence of silence are characteristic
in other types of discourse, too. For example . . . political discourse in the mass media is full of
ambiguous and evasive statements. This allows silence to be a prominent and powerful tool of
expression in political language” (47). Speech and silence, then, work together to create contexts in
which words become flavored. At the same time, however, it should be noted that just as words are
flavored by the silences that surround them, silences, too, may be flavored by the discourses surrounding
them. Any notion of heteroglossia, therefore, should include not just utterances, monologism/dialogism,
and the fluctuation between them, but it should include also silence.
Further, one might add that both silence and language are important in shaping the subject
because both “[come] to the subject from the world” (Foster 85), subjects must “grapple [with both] to
make meaning” (85), and subjects must “approximate [both] to [their] own intentions” (85) to speak to
the world. Jaworski’s work, most explicitly, supports such assertions. Jaworski says, “Our ability to use
silence appropriately in our own speech and the adequate interpretation of the silences of others are
indispensable for successful communication. Therefore, I believe children acquire the ability to use and
understand silence very much in the same manner that they acquire all the other linguistic skills in the
acquisition process” (4).
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One might suggest, as a result, that just as language comes to us from the world, so, too, do
silences and our methods of perceiving and interpreting them. Subjects constantly grapple not only with
language but with perceptions and interpretations of silence to make meaning. One must not only
grapple, for instance, with being silenced by an “other,” i.e. grappling with one’s own action/reaction to
the silencing, which may include grappling with a socially “acceptable” performance of silence or
speech, but one must also grapple with interpreting others’ silences, which may be both cultural and
situation specific. Interpreting another’s rhetorical silence is not easy and may easily result in
misinterpretation. Jaworski indicates, after all, that silence is “probably the most ambiguous of all
linguistic forms (24), and as a result “silence requires high participation and involvement and a lot of
filling in of information to be fully understood and interpreted. In Sperber and Wilson’s . . . terms . . .,
the processing effort necessary for the interpretation of silence is greater than in the case for most forms
of speech” (7).
Similarly, we must approximate our use of silence, like speech, to our own intentions. Are we
using silence in agreement? In opposition? To obfuscate? To avoid embarrassing or because of
embarrassment? To buy time in thinking about what to say? etc. It should also be noted that while we
often intend to fully control our silences (and the interpretation of those silences), doing so is not always
possible, and our silences often “say” what we would never “speak” aloud. Thus, we often must
struggle with ensuring our silences are interpreted in socially acceptable ways. Appropriating one’s use
of silence, however, may also include using intervening, fore-and-after, or deep silences etc. to fit our
purposes or to create moods that fit such purposes.

As a result, subjects grapple with

monologic/dialogic and heteroglossic forces in both language and silence – all of which create meaning
and impose order (as well as disorder) on our lives.

4.4 SELF
For Foster, consciousness is created through language and one’s agency depends upon, in
part, “the degree of mediation each subject is able to accomplish within the historical, cultural contexts
of their physical lives” (90). While subjects receive language from others, they must also use it to
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“mediate the gap between subjects” (92) as well as to bridge the gap between one’s inner and outer
selves. Of course, these assertions are not disputed. However, silence also may foster consciousness and
mediate gaps between inner/outer selves and self/other, and often, it works with language to do so. As
Braman suggests, contemplative silences (i.e. internal processes) are valuable for subjects in
constructing their realities because they enable subjects to generate knowledge about themselves, others,
and the world in which they exist. This knowledge offers a different perspective than that offered
through social constructionist approaches alone. For, as subjects contemplate their own actions, others,
or the world around them, for instance, they generate tacit insights. How subjects value these insights
and how they interpret these insights –i.e. how these mean to subjects -- also tacitly affects and mediates
their interactions – whether spoken or unspoken – with others.
Meditative silences, also, assist in bridging gaps between inner/outer selves as subjects reach “a
heightened perception of interiority” (59) or “intuitive modes of knowing” (59), which they may use to
mediate their inner existence with an outside world. This mediation may assist in meditating one’s
interactions with others. One should note, also, that communicative silences can also function to bridge
gaps between the self/other. For instance, shared communal silences, such as those encountered during
religious ceremonies or funerals, often mediate gaps between subjects, enabling them to encounter and
share deep, meaningful silences that bring them together or cause them to feel in similar ways.
Similarly, silent gestures, such as hugs or putting one’s hand on a widow’s shoulder often bridge gaps
between subjects in ways more powerful than words can. The extent to which such acts bridge gaps
between subjects, however, again depends on the rhetorical situation in which they occur.
Interestingly, Foster’s appropriation of responsive understanding does provide another space
through which silence enriches one’s subjectivity/self; in responsive understanding, experiences are
translated, evaluated, and reformulated to create new meanings. Selves, then, are created not just
through language, but through silent processes and acts of responsive understanding.
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4.5 ALTERITY
Foster’s theory of subjectivity indicates that language is important in any notion of alterity
because it is only through others (and the language of others) that subjects come to know themselves.
Because language belongs to more than one person – it exists on the boundary between self and other –
subjects must struggle to appropriate words and adapt them to their own meanings and intentions.
Similarly, because subjects cannot see themselves as objects in the world, they must rely on others’
visions of them to mediate what they know about themselves and others. Because subjects’ experiences
are shaped by different horizons, subjects need each other to achieve self-consciousness and to exist as
subjects.
Perhaps most important in a notion of alterity, however, is not only language, but the role silence
plays in assisting language so that subjects may learn about themselves, others, and the world from each
other. As Ratcliffe indicates, rhetorical listening in this process is integral. Indeed, it is only through
rhetorical listening, which occurs in silence, in conjunction with language that subjects can learn about
the world, others, and themselves. Because rhetorical listening requires subjects to adopt a “stance of
openness” (17) – to listen from a third space as discourses “wash over, through, and around [them] and
then . . . lie there to inform [their] politics and ethics” (28), subjects can better acknowledge other
discourses, understand their own and others’ claims as well as the belief systems they arise from,
question the validity of their own belief systems, negotiate troubled identifications like race and gender,
integrate the knowledge from others’ discourses into their own experiences, acknowledge differences
rather than erasing them, and negotiate their own attitudes, acts, etc.
As was discussed previously in Chapter 3, this act of listening positions both speaker and listener
in an important subject position, for both have an ethical responsibility to speak and listen. This
suggests that the silent act of listening, itself, is part of an integral dynamic process that with language
creates a bridge between self and other. After all, without such an act, language itself could not create a
bridge or mediate the gaps between self and other. Further, rhetorical listening suggests, too, that
subjectivity cannot be created solely through language. Subjects are shaped by their willingness and
capacity to speak as well as to listen.
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4.6 ADDRESSIVITY/ANSWERABILITY
The notion that subjects are formed through acts of speaking and listening is very important, for
it broadens Foster’s notion of addressivity and answerability. The terms tacitly posit a distinction
between hearing (i.e. being called to do something) and speaking, with one’s “speaking back” (i.e.
authoring oneself) emphasized. However, if we accept Ratcliffe’s notion of rhetorical listening, we
must assume that subjects are called to both listen and speak equally, for this is part of our ethical
responsibility of “becoming” and helping others to do the same. In listening, we engage in an act that
requires one’s full presence – one’s full awareness and attention—just as in speaking. One cannot
“hide” in such a silence nor can one become “absent.” This is important, for even when ideological
silences attempt to marginalize or negate subjects, rhetorical listening enables one to be always fully
present. The notion of rhetorical listening further implies that there is not just a single “call” from the
world to “author” one’s position, followed by a lifetime of writing and speaking from one’s own situated
position, but rather, one continually evolves through both as one interacts with others and the world in
which he or she exists.
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Chapter 5: Teaching Silence as Subjectivity in the Classroom
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Silence is often excluded in first-year-composition instruction and in first-year-composition
textbooks. Thus, students in first-year-composition classes are never made aware of the ways silence
contributes to their own subjectivities or the ways in which silence is used by others rhetorically in the
world around them to shape how they view others. Instead, classroom instruction and composition texts
emphasize the importance of language in shaping the student writer. Students are often told that the way
they use language shapes their ethos. Therefore, students often learn about how they can use language
to credibly persuade specific audiences, in specific contexts, using specific genres.
Because first-year-composition courses are usually only 15 weeks long and are institutionally
viewed as courses designed to teach students “basic writing skills,” it is clear why silence as a rhetorical
act is excluded from the curriculum, i.e. instructors may feel there is not enough time to teach students
the basic skills they need to know in addition to an esoteric concept like silence as a rhetorical act.
However, this chapter argues that including silence in first-year-composition classes is beneficial for
students, particularly because learning about silence as a rhetorical act that shapes ethos will make
students more aware of the ways they fully communicate with others – using both language and silence,
and as a result, they may become more strategic in their use of both to shape their ethos and to
communicate effectively.
In addition, this chapter argues that learning about silence as a rhetorical act need not occupy
extended weeks of study. Instead, silence could, perhaps, best be introduced to first-year students as a
strategy that, like language, shapes pathos, ethos, and logos. Because silence as a rhetorical act is
usually excluded from traditional texts, this chapter first looks at the way silence is treated in a more
progressive composition textbook and then examines how silence as a rhetorical act that shapes
subjectivity might be included in the second semester of the first-year-composition class. Finally, this
chapter looks at additional disciplinary areas where rhetorical silences may be important, and it
concludes by briefly discussing the importance of rhetorical silence to the roles of both teachers and
students in classroom instruction.
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5.2 SILENCE IN COMPOSE, DESIGN, ADVOCATE
The textbook, Compose, Design, Advocate: A Rhetoric for Integrating Written, Visual, and Oral
Communication, by Anne Frances Wysocki and Dennis A. Lynch was chosen for examination primarily
for two reasons. First, it has been selected as the text used for the recently redesigned second-semester
hybrid composition course at the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP). Second, unlike the texts that
have been used for that course in the past and that focus predominately on essay writing (e.g. The Aims
of Argument, A Rhetoric of Argument), Compose, Design, Advocate looks more progressively at
composition in the 21st century as composing and designing multiple kinds of “texts” using a variety of
media. Its multimedia and genre focus is important because it views not just writing, but speaking,
listening, and viewing as important in the communication process and in composing and designing in the
21st century. It is also atypical of other comparable writing textbooks because it does (briefly) address
the importance of epistemological notions of silence, and it marginally addresses ideological notions of
silence in the communication process.

Indeed, of the three texts used to teach second-semester

composition at UTEP listed above, it is the only text that references listening in its index.
Although Compose, Design, Advocate is a very progressive text, like most textbooks, it does not
directly discuss silence as a rhetorical act that students may use to construct their subjectivities or that
plays a part in the way they construct the subjectivities of others. The text is divided into three sections –
“Designing Compositions Rhetorically,” “Producing Compositions,” and “Analyzing the Arguments of
Others” (v). The first time the authors explicitly mention the word silence on page three, they use it in
the traditional context as an absence of speech. They suggest, for instance, “We have been knocked into
silence by hearing strangers respond enthusiastically and thoughtfully to articles we’ve written” (3).
Silence, here, is depicted as something that happens to someone rather than as an act one chooses for
rhetorical purposes. In much of this section, Wysocki and Lynch tacitly present silence as a background
in which language occurs, and words are clearly the intended focus for students. They suggest, for
instance, “The tradition of composition and rhetoric have helped us -- and many others – approach
writing and speaking situations systematically and thoughtfully, with an awareness of the responsibility
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of our words and of the power we have to shape situations around us when we shape our words to fit
them” (3). Here Wysocki and Lynch tacitly suggest that it is language that shapes our realities, and as a
result, students must use language in a responsible way. Language is thus very powerful, and clearly,
silence does not occupy the same place that language does.
To be fair, Wysocki and Lynch do, however, present silence as important epistemologically. For
instance, in the section on “How You Have Been Shaped as a Communicator” (13), they suggest that
listening is an important part in the communication process because it can help students “make sense” of
how others have interpreted their writing or visual compositions. They tacitly indicate that students
must silence themselves and attend to what others have to say about their work to better understand
others’ responses to their works. Listening, then, becomes an important skill in gaining peer feedback
from other students and is an important skill for speakers/writers as well as audience members/readers. It
is requisite in testing compositions with audiences. They also later tacitly indicate silence is important
in thinking and inventing. They suggest, “Before you do anything else you need to set aside time to
think. . . . Having a quite time and place set aside for nothing but thinking is necessary if you are to
produce communications that satisfy you” (62). Here, Wysocki and Lynch, perhaps, view silence as a
context – a surrounding atmosphere (much like Picard) required for productive invention.
Wysocki and Lynch also tacitly address ideological notions of silence, but not in great detail.
They suggest listening may be important to understand institutional contexts and they ask students to
consider the following: “Do you have more authority than those you are speaking to, or less, and how
will that affect what you can or cannot say and do?” (39). Elsewhere, they encourage students to be
aware of the communication medium their audiences have access to particularly so that these audiences
are not excluded. They say, for instance, “Keep your eye on who is included – and who is excluded – by
the medium you choose. Not everyone has easy access to computers or to high speed internet
connections” (45). Clearly, Wysocki and Lynch show that they are aware of the ways in which
discourses silence; however, they present ideological silence not as a rhetorical act that silences students
or through which they silence others, but rather as a practical matter in effective communications.
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In section two of the book, “Producing Compositions,” silence is mentioned as part of a context
in which certain kinds of communication are more appropriate than others. They indicate, “At a funeral,
most people expect silence, solemnity, and seriousness. They also expect that when someone does
speak, the person will speak quietly . . . with a certain kind of dignity” (208). Wysocki and Lynch also
go into much more detail about the importance of listening. They assert, “Good speaking grows out of
good listening. Listening also provides guidance we need to make decisions about what to say and when
to say it” (225). In the most explicit and detailed discussion involving silence throughout the whole text,
the authors spend five pages discussing such things as differences between participatory listening and
passive listening, empathetic listening and objective listening, nonjudgmental listening and critical
listening, and in depth listening and surface listening. Only toward the end of the section, however, to do
they indicate that silence, like language can be used as a meaningful act. Again, however, they allude to
this only in discussing how the body communicates. They say, “Depending on the culture into which
you grew up, not speaking or being silent can mean different things” (254). The authors then move
on to delivery.
Although Compose, Design, Advocate does include silence as epistemological and ideological,
and as important in communication, like most traditional textbooks, it does not ask students to examine
how silence functions as a rhetorical act that shapes meaning or that influences how one’s ethos is
constructed. Teaching students to do so, however, would not be as difficult as one might initially think.

5.3 TEACHING SILENCE AS PATHOS/ETHOS/LOGOS
Perhaps a more organic way of introducing silence as a rhetorical act into a composition class
would be to introduce it as a strategic act that, like language, contributes to pathos, ethos, and logos. In
second-semester composition, the rhetorical concepts of pathos, ethos, and logos are normally easily
understood by students and are required as part of the curriculum. Compose, Design, Advocate, for
instance, discusses how pathos, ethos, and logos are created in written texts, oral speeches, and visual
communications. After teaching the concepts using language, one could easily provide students a
chapter out of Glenn’s Unspoken or a similar article discussing silence as a rhetorical act before
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suggesting to students that silence, too, is inevitably used to shape pathos, ethos, and logos. After
having students read briefly about silence, teachers might begin by having students consider the ways in
which rhetorical silence is used to purposely create certain feelings. Teachers might ask students to think
about situations or places in their daily lives that require acts of silence and how that silence creates
certain effects in people.
Students at first may initially discuss religious silences or the silences in funeral homes or
libraries as well as the effects these create.

Later, however, they might examine how broadcast

journalists use silences for effect (for example the silence that accompanies the “In Memoriam” section
on the news program This Week). As students share how these silences affect them aloud, they might
find that they conceive of silence differently, and similar situations of silence may create different
effects in students. Such differences create openings for discussing how ideologies of silence differ,
how they are shaped socially and culturally, and how ideological differences result in different ways of
perceiving and understanding one’s reality. Once students understood the ways in which rhetorical acts
of silence contributed to pathos, they might then begin to analyze more deeply the ways in which silence
contributes to ethos.
To examine the ways in which rhetorical acts of silence shape ethos, students might first begin
by watching a television docu-drama. Students might analyze the rhetorical silences of subjects in the
docu-drama (or of the reporters, themselves) and how those silences influenced how the persons
involved were perceived. The same task could be accomplished through watching television sitcoms or
by eavesdropping on serious conversations. The main idea would be for students to keep notes on who
was speaking and who was silent/silenced, what was occurring, and the rhetorical context so that
students later could discuss the following questions: 1. What is the rhetorical context? 2. Who is silent
and why? (What seems to be the reason for the silence?) 3. What does that silence communicate? 4.
What is the overall effect of that silence on the discussion or on the relationship? 5. How does the
silence position the subject (i.e. Does it place the subject in a place of power? Does it subjugate them?
Etc.)? 6. How does that silence shape their ethos? (Does it shape the ethos positively or negatively and
why? Does it cause us to perceive them in a certain way?)
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Perhaps as a stepping stone to a more difficult analytical assignment, which could be used in the
final documentary students produce in second-semester composition, students could also read Barry
Brummett’s “Towards a Theory of Silence as a Political Strategy,” discussed in Chapter three. Using
Brummett’s model, instructors might ask students to research a small political scandal by a public figure
– preferably one that was not ongoing – and to analyze for the way in which silences constructed ethos.
This task would require students to more deeply engage in the learning skills that the secondsemester composition course requires of them. They would need, for instance, to research all primary
documents surrounding the scandal, and would need to selectively research secondary documents.
Initially, students might focus their research on statements made in written speeches by the official
embroiled in the scandal over a brief span of time to identify 1. When and where the silences occurred,
2. What the silences involved, and 3. How the public responded to those silences. Students, of course,
would need to use secondary sources, such as editorials or commentary by journalism pundits, to get a
sense of how communities responded to that silence. The assignment would challenge students to attend
to two things, which they don’t always attend to: 1) the entire rhetorical context of the scandal, i.e. not
just the speech but on analyzing silences as well, and 2) the order in which both the spoken statements
and silences occurred, which would be important in order to analyze speech and silence in relation to
each other.
Certainly, the assignment would require more effort from students, but it would also preclude
them from choosing random bits of information from random places, which they often do to support
their argument. Such an assignment would require them to think about the information they selected
and how that information “fit in” with the entire context of their research and writing. It would also
force them to examine the “gaps” – the “silences” -- and to analyze the role those silences played in the
rhetorical situation to construct how the public viewed the ethos of the political figure. Further, it would
require them to consider the responsibility they have as citizens to analyze not just what political figures
said, but also what they purposefully chose not to say to shape public perceptions of them.
Finally, as students examined the ways in which rhetorical acts of silence constructed pathos and
ethos, they might also begin to see how silence shapes logos. That is, rhetorical acts of silence can
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shape the meaning of what is said, and thus what readers or audiences know. In addition, rhetorical acts
of silencing can tacitly exclude information or certain groups of people, thus changing what we know.
Or, silence may function as part of an arranged sequence of language moves that effect what we know
and how we know it.
If the goal of the second-semester composition course, after all, is to teach students to think and
communicate rhetorically, they must learn not just how to effectively use language or audiovisual
information. They must learn that language and silence construct how others perceive them, and rather
than hiding behind those silences, as students often do, they must be taught that silence, also, is a
rhetorical act that has meaning and communicates, whether they intend for it to or not. Thus, they must
understand, also, that they must be as responsible in using their silences as they do their words because
those silences are as powerful as words in constructing their relationships with others.

5.4 CONCLUSION
Because silence plays such an important role in effective communication, and indeed in the way
we perceive and understand ourselves and others, scholars of rhetoric may need to consider, not just how
silence functions in theories of subjectivity, but also how it functions in other areas of disciplinary
interest, such as theories of rhetoric, technical communication, writing in the disciplines, and writing
across the disciplines; for in each, silence communicates and shapes ideologies, epistemologies, and
ontologies just as language does. Further, because rhetorical acts of silence shape so much of our
subjectivities, subjects need to be made aware of the ways in which it shapes those subjectivities and of
the ways in which they can use silence rhetorically to communicate more effectively.
Essentially, teaching about silence and its rhetorical uses is important because it holds subjects
(including teachers and students) to a higher level of accountability in communicating and behaving
responsibly. Communication, that is, does not end – it is not “turned off” – when one finishes speaking
or is silent. Rather, because silence communicates, and is, at the same time, an action and process
through which we make sense of the world, we must be as accountable for our silences as we are for our
discourse. We must become accountable not only for what our silences convey or fail to convey, but we
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must also accept responsibility for how we use our silences and the effects those silences have on
ourselves, others, and the world around us.
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